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Chapter 1: Introduction
“Our purpose is to consider what form of political community is best of all for those who are most able
to realize their ideal of life. We must therefore examine not only this but other constitutions, both such
as actually exist in well-governed states, and any theoretical forms which are held in esteem; that what is
good and useful may be brought in light. And let no one suppose that in seeking for something beyond
them we are anxious to make a sophistical display at any cost; we only undertake this inquiry because all
the constitutions with which we are acquainted are faulty.”
-Aristotle, The Politics
1.1

Briefing
As political creatures our purpose of examination should be in hopes of actualizing factors from

which optimal communities are crafted. We do this holding nothing back knowing even the best
governments are imperfect; progression of our species being a lasting concern from Aristotle’s times
well into our own. Contemporarily an issue of debate is the role executive officers have in modern
constitutional governments. There remain irreconcilable contentions between the purposes and limiting
factors of governance. This disjunction is at the heart of the question this thesis asks: what is best for
society, an executive who is an arbiter in his own right or an executive who is a steward of the
government they are part of?1
This philosophical question embodies the contemporary concept “executive prerogative,” this
term is highly disputed. A problem, as many theorists have noted, is that this concept is elusive to
define. Executive prerogative involves immense implications on the relationships between various actors
including: executives, other branches in governments, constitutions and the associated peoples. This
thesis holds in order to rightfully address this question and the concept of executive prerogative one
ought to investigate the purposes and properness of the elements in governance. Operationalization of
the terminology in this matter is critically important to more fully understanding the debate at hand.

1

The word “arbiter” is used in regards to the executive being able to judge and use discretion independent of the civil laws of
the associated government whether or not their actions are just or not. The word “steward” is used in historical terms such as
“stewardship” of a position entrusted to manage the affairs of an entity, usually denoted as not having sole ownership rights
and working only within those bounds.
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The ideal of proper governance is analyzed closely for key arguments. The arguments are
presented into more palatable points to ease their digestion. This aids our larger objective of attempting
to determine the factors required in the best possible governances. These guiding principles of the
intended use of executive prerogative allow for the betterment of dynamics in states. From the times of
ancient Greece, the elements of legitimate governance, authority and the people have thrived in political
theory. The interest in political ideology waivered as European societies focuses changed throughout the
following centuries. The fall of the Roman Empire created a vacuum filled by theological works that
often drove state policies, foreign and domestic. As Europe wrestled with its identity and direction
throughout the middle ages, the ground work for the eventual social contract theorists was laid.
Thomas Hobbes is usually credited as the first among the contractualists of Europe that changes
the outlook on political philosophy forever. Hobbes writes The Leviathan in the midst of horror and
anxiety of that ravaged Europe after the 30 Years War. Seeking to establish lasting foundations of
governance Hobbes wishes to end horrendous conditions anarchy produces. The Leviathan is concerned
only with forging governance; there is no preference of form or righteousness beyond the regime’s
creation. The progression of the Enlightenment in Europe challenges the accepted notions of legitimate
governance giving way to greater scrutiny of regimes. The evolution of social contract works galvanize
political ideology as the basis for the foundation of nation states that exist into our day. John Locke and
Jean- Jacques Rousseau are Hobbes successors. These men are among the most notable political minds
ever and are of great importance to confronting lasting questions in societies. Executive prerogative is at
the heart of contractual work, enduring as an engaging and thriving matter of concern.
John Locke of Somerset, England aspires to better establish the true principles of the objectives
of governance. Theorizing during the span of the Glorious Revolution in England allows Locke the
luxury of questioning the legitimacy of tyrannical powers. Locke’s works greatly contrasts his Hobbes’
works. Locke’s position in history enables him to better explain what government objectives should be.
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Lockean governing principles are founded on a static foundation of fundamental laws that guide human
reasoning. John Locke’s works, namely The Second Treatise of Government, contributes to our
understanding of nation states. Locke is essential to the evolution and procurement of contemporary
constitutional governments. Various parts of Locke’s work, including executive prerogative, have
lasting contentions and implications. Chapter 14, “On Prerogative,” is brief in length, but is the most
extensive writing of concern to our subject matter. This is the basis to begin the dialogue of executive
prerogative and foundation of interpretation to assess properness of executive actions. Locke’s work
spurs many writers over the years to attempt to make sense of executive prerogative. Often times Locke
seems to leave us more questions than answers.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau enters the philosophical debate focusing on political right and authority.
Expanding upon the vested interests of individuals Rousseau’s goals differ from Locke’s writings.
Governing objectives are secondary to the importance of a regime’s legitimacy. The means governments
take are essential to just states. Rousseau’s works in a large way are the backdrop for many modern
political ideologies. Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s alternative perspective of social contracts provides further
understanding to the complexities and principles of governance. Most important to the progression of
social contract work is the relationship between people and their state. Locke and Rousseau’s differing
interpretations of the duties of officials of the state are of special notoriety. The conclusions of Locke
and Rousseau are founded on the ideals of their respective perspectives of proper governance. Each
philosopher has a different emphasis to consider and explore in regards to the ideology encompassing
executives in our philosophical question, as this thesis will show.
1.2

Literature Review
Arthur M. Schlesinger generates much discussion in the debate concerning executive prerogative

with his famous work The Imperial Presidency. Schlesinger captures the conscious of many to notice the
dramatic increase in scope and power of The Office of The President of the United States over the
course of our nation’s history. Comparing U.S. Presidents and their actions with the legislative branch
3

and the masses highlights growth of executive discretion. Consulting various works, such as The
Federalist papers, Schlesinger takes great care and expertise to explain the differing perspectives of
executive prerogative. Ultimately, the conclusion is reached contending that if done properly
emergencies may warrant use of executive discretion. The standards of when executive prerogative is
properly used should be “stringently and pervasively” assessed and are:
1. There must be a clear, present and broadly perceived danger to the life of the nation and to the
ideals for which the nation stands.
2. The President must define and explain to Congress and the people the nature and urgency of the
threat.
3. The understanding of the emergency, the judgment that the life of the nation is truly at stake,
must be broadly shared by Congress and the people.
4. Time must be of the essence; existing statutory authorizations must be inadequate; and waiting
for normal legislature action must constitute an unacceptable risk.
5. Then danger must be one that can be met in no other way than by presidential initiative beyond
the laws and the Constitution.
6. Secrecy must be strictly confined to the tactical requirements of the emergency. Every question
of basic policy must be opened to national debate.
7. The President must report what he has done to Congress, which, along with the Supreme Court
and ultimately the people will serve as the judge of his action.
8. None of the presidential actions can be directed against the domestic political process and rights.
(459)
Greater understandings of executive prerogative are heightened in times of resurgence of foreign
matters. The Cold War as Schlesinger noted had an important role in putting the country and president
into a sustained state of heightened national security. The executive branch fluctuates in its ability to
assert discretionary powers.2 The Executive Office is seen to be once again as an expanding entity. Since
September 11, the Bush and Obama Administrations have advocated active engagement of the security
interests of America. The following authors highlight the discourse in the greater discussion of executive
prerogative since Schlesinger’s famous publication.
Larry Arnhart criticizes Schlesinger in his 1979 journal publication “The God-Like Prince.”
Arnhart weary of the implications of allowing the executive to ever go beyond the limitations the
Constitution even in emergencies argues that there are only three possible ways to think of executive
prerogative: either bound completely within the Constitution, completely outside, and lastly a mixture of
2

The fluctuation of Presidential powers especially in regards to foreign policies can be seen in the following administrations:
decline in the Carter Administration, Regan Administration’s significant rise, and decrease during Clinton’s times.
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both (126). Arnhart maintains the framers provide the Constitutional structure ample flexibility that
successfully incorporates the limits of executive discretion. The Constitution’s goals of the balance of
powers are adequate for every circumstance. The Federalist papers detail these matters, 70, 23, 69, and
65 among others. James Madison in Federalist 48 written as Publius emphasizes that there should be no
“parchment barriers” in the Constitution that run counter to what is dictated by public necessity (129).
Furthermore, Arnhart perceives Abraham Lincoln’s actions that Schlesinger assesses are actually a
usurpation of powers. Arnhart affirms that provisions can be found within the Constitution for
emergencies muting the need for prerogative stating “the very fact that the Constitution does contain
specific provisions for dealing with emergencies suggests that there is no general emergency power to
act outside the Constitution” (129). Arnhart closes with an insightful warning that if all executives were
of Lincoln’s caliber then prerogative would not be of such a dramatic concern. The reality, however, is
that most presidents are of lesser quality “the Constitution provides discretionary powers equal to all
contingencies in a manner that protects against the abuse of these powers” (130).
Thomas S. Langston and Michael E. Lind deny the premise that Locke’s work definitively has
the immense influence of our state as so many other theorists contend. Langston and Lind furthermore
debate that there are differing and distinct types of prerogative. In their 1991 work “John Locke and the
Limits of Presidential Prerogative,” Langston and Lind seek to classify prerogative powers. An analysis
of those powers can determine if they are incorporated in the U.S. Constitution: and thus limited by the
Constitution. Langston and Lind argue that Locke recognizes two types of prerogative those associated
with specific governments and the general which are pardoning and discretionary privileges. Pardoning,
antilegal prerogative is provided to bring people in to the grasp of law, and not specifically an executive
power.3 While, discretionary, prelegal prerogative “can be restricted or completely eliminated (unwise
though that might be) by the legislative power through ordinary legislation” (66).4 They assert that
inherent executive privileges by right of office are erroneous interpretations of Locke. What Locke
writes about and what is found in the Constitution is different. More importantly though Langston and

3
4

The term antilegal is defined by Langston and Lind as laws giving way to fundamental law.
The term prelegal is defined by Langston and Lind as a power existing prior to formation of a social contract.
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Lind conclude “any prerogative of the President to act in the silence of the laws or against laws, exist
only at the sufferance of Congress” (68).
Clement Fatovic’s 2004 work, “Constitutionalism and Presidential Prerogative: Jeffersonian and
Hamiltonian Perspectives,” revisits the debate of prerogative in a post-September 11, 2001 society.
Their investigation is of two perspectives of prerogative that has dominated our country since its
inception. Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson, founding fathers The United States, are said to
have accepted “John Locke’s doctrine of prerogative” but differ in their perspectives of its
constitutionality. According to Fatovic, Jefferson treats executive powers as being explicitly enumerated
in the Constitution so that:
the burden of proof [for using prerogative] falls squarely on the executive to prove that his or her
actions are legitimate in spite of their illegality. Instead of distorting the meaning of the
Constitution to justify necessary exercises of presidential prerogative, Jefferson preferred to have
executives violate the law outright and let the public judge the propriety of their acts (434).
Oppositely, Hamilton sees prerogative to be implicitly in the Constitution. Discretionary executive
powers are an inherent part of the office, according to Fatovic, Hamilton claims “enumerated powers did
not exhaust the power of government, at least not where the executive was concerned” (438). After
comparing and contrasting the differing views, he concedes that “prerogative is an extralegal device.”5
In his conclusion, Fatovic finds two opposing objectives a viable Constitution must properly balance:
first, it must enable statesmen to deal with the ordinary and extraordinary problems of politics; second, it
must prevent those same statesmen from becoming threats to liberties and other values they are
appointed to preserve (442).
Ross Corbett’s 2006 article, “The Extraconstitutionality of Lockean Prerogative,” debates the
question of the fundamental basis behind prerogative. Corbett asks if it is truly an inherent right of the
executive pointing out the prince’s powers pre-exist the legislative limits that contain his power (435).
Critical to Lockean prerogative are responsive beneficial laws that require foresight, which is why law
itself cannot rule. After investigating and presenting examples Corbett highlights that the pardoning
privilege of the executive means that there are instances where citizens can also go beyond the limits of
civil laws. The provisions are that trespasses are for the benefit of society and they require remedy from
5

Extralegal according to Fatovic, meaning that the legal basis is not found within the Constitution.
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prosecution. Corbett defends that prerogative is an extraconstitutional necessity that safe guards the
natural order of preserving the society:
limited only by the public good, and no law can similarly restrain a right of acting without or
against the law for that good. The individual’s power to do what the preservation of mankind
requires is surrendered in political society insofar as is consonant with the preservation of that
society. In short, even if the fundamental law were to deny the prince any right to benefit the
people arbitrarily, this would not imply that he is normatively forbidden from doing so (443).
Thus, prerogative is understood to be a right derived from the state of nature indwelled in all individuals.
Discretionary actions are simply an “exercises in private judgment” and their uses are incompatible with
civil laws (446). The conclusion is that prerogative is not a legal doctrine that can be found in civil laws.
The use of prerogative comes with the risk; executive actions are subject to being received as
illegitimate and not coming from legal authority. Corbett notes in the beginning of the article that public
perception of political authority is “the essence of political society” (428).
The most notable work in terms of comparison to this thesis’ objectives is Harvey Mansfield’s
1989 book, Taming the Prince. Mansfield critically analyzes the executive office in terms of its
philosophical evolution. The contemporary notions of executive prerogative are derivatives developed
by Machiavelli, Hobbes and culminating with Locke. The basis of Locke’s executive prerogative is
given great care by Mansfield as the concepts of the contemporary executive are assessed in light of the
associated principles. The conclusion of which is that executive prerogative is a very complex matter
founded and part of the history of our political heritage.
Thomas Jefferson was one of our founding fathers of this nation, and the third President of the
United States. Jefferson is a critically acclaimed student of Locke’s works. As a scholar and practitioner
of governance and its elements, including executive powers, Jefferson’s writings are very insightful. In
September of 1810, Jefferson explores and explains executive prerogative in a letter titled “A Law
Beyond The Constitution.” Short in length, this letter still manages to grasp the very heart of the topic
that theorists seem to be troubled with today. Jefferson’s work should be referenced as a basis to
understanding Lockean perspectives by scholars on the topic.

7

1.3

Methods
This paper uses deep textual analysis of the works of John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau as

its primary focus of understanding and deduction. There is great diligence given to chapter 14 of
Locke’s Second Treatise of Civil Government, “On Prerogative.” Rousseau’s perspective on proper
governance is utilized to build the foundation of his logic on the matter of executive prerogative. The
main arguments are derived from Rousseau’s various works which are the following (in no particular
order): The Social Contract, Origin of Inequality, Political Economy, and The Government of Poland. In
order to better accomplish the goals of this debate, this thesis presents interruptions of the theorists’
arguments as logic statements wherever applicable and helpful. The differences of the theorists’
perspectives are helpful to thoroughly analyzing our greater philosophical question. The ideologies of
Locke and Rousseau are foundations of philosophical schools of thought for many contemporary
governments. Their works behold a great capacity when properly studied to assist in contemporary
concerns of governance within societies, principally and specifically.
1.4

Organization strategy
The organization of this paper is composed of three main sections. The first section intensively

analyzes the discourses of John Locke. The understanding of the Locke’s state of nature being essential
to addressing any issues of governance he expounds upon. Objectives for governance and the forms of
states are explained as the basis for the concept of executive prerogative. Thoroughly combing through
Locke’s reasoning the concept six fundamental principles of executive prerogative are derived. This
provides a footing for better understanding the implications of the fundamental problems at hand.
The second section investigates Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s works as an alternative proposal to the
static principles of Locke. In order to effectively gain insight on executive prerogative, the basis and
purpose of proper governments must be thoroughly addressed. The second section is designed to mirror
the work in the first as a comparative study between the theorists. This is undoubtedly a difficult
comparison due to the great differences. It is through Rousseau’s various works that three tenets for
proper governance are built. Rousseau’s focus on the governing force of society is the general will: the
people’s will which is the sovereign identity of nation states. Rousseau unexpected submits to the use of
8

executive discretion. The factors that position Rousseau to advocate for executive actions beyond the
constraints of the general will are extremely noteworthy. These developments are essential to properly
and more understanding governance.
The third section assesses and operationalizes the contemporary concept of executive prerogative
that previous sections analyze. The principles and purposes of governance of executive prerogative
according to Locke and Rousseau are operationalized as three maxims. These three maxims are used as
the backdrop of the foundations that provide for proper governance the contemporary discussion
between Presidentialists and Constitutionalists on executive discretion. Lastly, after having now the
tools to properly assess the philosophical question, whether it is optimal for executive officers to act as
arbiters or stewards, guiding principles give greater understanding behind executive actions in relation to
interests of society. The remaining contentions are evaluated in aspiration of grasping more concrete
findings to the disjunction between modern Constitutional governments and their purpose. The difficulty
of the answering the philosophical question having come to fruition allows for addressing the
implications and recommendations for establishing more perfect unions and orders among men.

9

Chapter 2: Locke’s Executive Prerogative
“If anyone, concerned really for truth, undertake the confutation of my hypothesis, I promise him either
to recent my mistake, upon fair conviction; or to answer his difficulties.”
-Locke, Preface to the Second Treatise of Government
2.1

The State of Nature & Reason for Governance
Social contract theorists often utilize a conceptual state of nature in their works to elaborate on

the principles political power and its true relationship with society. Like Thomas Hobbes, Locke
dedicates much time and energy to analyzing societies without governments in hopes of discovering the
guiding principles and interactions of these concepts.6 It is absolutely necessary to understanding the
executive prerogative of Locke to see the argument’s placement in his larger logic of governance. It is
through objectives built throughout the entire Second Treatise of Governments that true nature of
prerogative rests.
To Locke, the natural state of man without traditional governments is at first in peaceful station
without reservation of harm from others. Everything in existence is held in commons and is plentiful.
Nature is seemingly a state of complacency for man, as there is no ownership of anything and therefore
nothing to be in conflict over. In Locke’s state of nature the reason for governance would be an
unexplained event if left without a factor initiating disagreement among human beings. Locke breaks the
serenity of the natural state of man by providing him a means of declaring ownership. With all of nature
being held in commons to all men, it is only their own bodies that Locke allots men private ownership
over. Each individual having ownership over himself is a simple assertion of reason to Locke.
Consequently, one would then be privy and entitled to the fruits of his own labors.
It is only through the use of labor that something is given value in nature to man. Without labor
an object would be useless to all of mankind. Initially, affiliations are those of natural ordering,
structured around families and tribes. Paternal positioning vests the authority of family units as a

6

Where to begin a summary of political theory is always debatable. Throughout western political thought there has been a
history of introspectively analyzing political authority, Antigone being notable among the ancient tradition. For this thesis’
purposes a short summary highlights Thomas Hobbes who in 1651, published his famous work, The Leviathan, where he
describes a lawless world outside of societal structures. Almost thirty years after Hobbes’ publication Robert Filmer
published his work Patriarcha that critiques Hobbes’ assertions and expands on paternal rights to governance. Sir Filmer's
arguments are clearly identified in Locke’s First Treatise of Governments.
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practical matter of cohesive security. As families aggregate into larger groups there the question arises
of who is best situated to direct the now community of men? Since all men in Locke’s natural state are
without traditional government there is no one, individual or group, that are by reason justified as being
designated to have authority to rule over the rest. All men are simply creatures of the same rank and
order, with none superior or inferior by natural designation. All human beings are thus equal to all other
humans being as creatures of the same facility. Unlike other creatures people are divinely granted the
capability of advanced reasoning.
People in the state of nature are in perfect freedom yet there exists universal limitations that
actively bond men to a coherent direction. With no lasting incentive for conflict this not a state of war.7
Inevitably disagreements over property arise as individual interests’ interplay adversely affecting the
lives and liberties of men. This innate reasoning and a history of socializing as a species provides us the
foundation to derive that it is advantageous to seek the preservation of all members as much as possible:
If I do harm, I must look to suffer, there being no reason that others should show greater measure
of love to me, than they have by me, showed unto them; my desire therefore to be loved of my
equals in nature, as much as possible may be, imposeth upon me a natural duty of bearing to
themward, fully the like affection (§5, 117).
Additionally, the collective value of the whole community increases with its membership size. The
problem which we now see is when each man seeks his own self-preservation arbitrarily. In accordance,
simultaneously and potentially frequently the preservation of all people may be able to be inversely
affected. Due to this problem the need for traditional governance arises. It is with this premise of logic to
which John Locke explores the rest of his discourse on governance and society throughout The Second
Treatise.
The crowning piece to Locke’s contribution in contractual work is the exploration in purpose of
Governance. Hobbes previously establishes similar reasoning to why traditional governance occurs, but
with indifference to regime forms his purpose is paradoxically lost. 8 As gravity acts on matter, reason
7

Compare to Hobbes' portrayal of the state of nature in Chapter 13 of The Leviathan titled, “Of the Naturall Condition of
Mankind, as concerning their Felicity, and Misery” that describes “If any two men desire the same thing, which neverthelesse
they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies... [existing in a state of war that directs] continuall feare, and danger of violent
death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short” (184).
8 Locke extensively acknowledges Filmer’s short fall addressing the entire First Treatise of Governments to appealing related
misconceptions of legitimate authority.
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directs individuals and individuals are the atoms of governments. Reason directs the true purpose of
governments and obliges and restrains man’s actions eternally. While interpretations may differ from
perspectives of angles, a singular static universal truth exists that governs individuals and civil unions.
This same force driving the creation of any governance is also the tool that measures its legitimacy: the
Fundamental Laws of Nature.
The Fundamental Laws of Nature compels the reason of rational beings to always seek selfpreservation. Infringement on one’s life, liberty and property is perceivable by all men, each innately
containing their own inalienable compass of judgment. To deprive a person the capacity to derive the
legitimacy of governance and submit to unbeneficial powers is to make that person an irrational being.
An irrational being is consequently not a human being. Through reasoning man sees, beyond the simple
tribes and clans of the past. Legitimate forms of governance are required to mutually ensure the common
life, liberty, and property of all. A person being part of the whole is righteously directed to ensure the
order and maintenance of the whole. All civil societies are established to better fulfill these goals and
are simply illegitimate if practicing opposing principles, as Locke denotes that "municipal laws of
countries, which are only so far right, as they are founded on the law of nature, by which they are to be
regulated and interpreted” (§12, 120). Force and power has never seemed to be an issue of shortage in
politics, but authority consistently has been. So it is not necessary the regulation but the interpretation of
the Laws of Nature that are among the greatest difficulties of societies. Following the direction of Saint
Thomas Augustine, Locke equates the Laws of Nature to Divine Law. Revelations of the elements
needed to achieve the desired governance of societies are modes and orders established by God and
revealed, such the Torah to Moses. Despite the existence and revelation of the Laws of Nature men
require common legislation and promulgation against discrepancies among individuals. It is thus
governments that alleviates the problems associated with confusion and disorder that occurs when men
are judges in their own cases. In §13, Locke notes that their partiality and passions is why God
appointed governments to restrain these inconveniences since:
it is unreasonable for men to be judges in their own cases, that self-love will make men partial to
themselves... I easily grant civil government is the proper remedy for the inconveniences of the
state of nature, which must certainly be great... since tis' easily to be imagined, that he who was
so unjust as to do his brother an injury, will scarce be so just to condemn himself for it... absolute
12

monarchs are but men, and if government is to be the remedy of those evils, which necessarily
follow from men's being judges in their own cases, and the state of nature is therefore not [to] be
endured, I desire to know what kinds of government that is, and how much better it is than the
state of nature, where one man commanding a multitude, has the liberty to be judge in his own
case, and may do to all his subjects whatever he pleases, without the least liberty to anyone to
question or control those who execute his pleasure? And in whatsoever he doth, whether led by
reason, mistake or passion, must submitted to? Much better it is in the state of nature wherein
men are not bound to submit to the unjust will of another: and if he that judges, judges amiss in
his own, or any other case, he is answerable for it to the rest of mankind (121).
Locke closes the chapter by emphasizing that "all men are naturally in that state, and remain so, till their
own consents they make themselves members in some politic society," so all men who are in civil
society exist in communion and fellowship only by their own agreement (§15, 122).
2.2

Roles of the Legislature & Executive
It is preeminently important to the understanding of Locke’s writing on governments to

emphasize that governance is authority exerted in existing societies. Authority is the recognized actor to
legitimately exert force for order by the majority of the people in a society. People as creatures of reason
submit to only sound interests that benefit themselves and greater society. People by innate reasoning
are compelled always to seek self-preservation and the preservation of society (both are mutually
beneficial to communities). These are necessary and sufficient conditions of governance. Regimes
directed towards private interests and not the benefit of the community, are not governance at all; but
more adequately define tyranny. The best forms of governments are thus the ones that are most adapted
to secure the objectives of society. The lives, liberties, and properties held in commons by all individuals
are the most fundamental assets to the public good.
The progression of political regimes overtime has been largely due to the inconsistent
procurement of governance guided by the principle of benefiting all. The greatest patriarchs of clans and
tribes lead with mastery and prestige. Many lesser regimes overtime, however, manipulated their
position forgoing benevolent aspirations. This lead to more clearly defined and limited uses of the
executive authority and discretion that was granted to patriarchs, that would become in some regimes
kings and princes. In history some societies saw it increasingly beneficial to divide the sources of
legislation and executive actions all together. Divisions are established to limit the potential for abuses
of political power. Civil and natural laws are essential for maintaining order in civil societies.
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Throughout history, constitutions have increasingly been used to define not only the political powers,
but the limits of governance.
The founding of constitutional and divided governments has been a lengthily process of
refinement during the course of our species’ history. Interpreting what is best for the community was
largely initially left to the discretion of individuals or groups to decipher the needs of the whole.
Throughout most of history monarchy has been the most prevalent political form, with very few states
being successful otherwise.9 Locke’s writings are during the Glorious Revolution, a time of expanding
desire to fortify the abilities of the legislature branch of regimes as supreme in sound governance.
The division of the responsibilities of governance is a progression from its earliest forms of a
single entity to more clearly defined branches. It was the abuses of the executive that society decided to
seek remedies by the constraints in structures of divisions in governance.10 Through constitutions the
separation of the elements of governance are concretely erected as explicit statements directing
discretion of executive authority of communities to defined goals. In Chapter 12, Locke explains the
reasoning in further detail stating “because it may be too great of a temptation to human frailty apt to
grasp at power, for the same persons who have the power of making laws, to have also in their hands the
power to execute them" (§143, 189). The legislature is designed and enlisted as the body of governance
that asserts the will of a nation through the promulgation of the interrupted laws having the purpose of
achieving the public good as legitimate governance. The executive position being subordinate to the
legislative is the entity entrusted as the source of the common energy of civil societies, providing the
authorized force necessary to implement the will of public. The will of the public is the will of the
people and therefore is always supreme to governance. The legislature is the formal entity enlisted as a
liaison between the people and creation of societal laws. It follows then, that in the best founded
9

A few regimes worth noting are: Democratic Athens that helped establish the lasting notion valuing individual expression in
politics, Lycurgus’ Sparta being among the rarest style of regimes ever made, and lastly the period Rome’s Senate ruled.
10 In The Second Treatise of Government, Locke writes “it was no wonder that they should pitch upon and naturally run into
that form of government which, from their infancy, they had been all accustomed to, and which, by experience, they had
found both easy and safe. To which if we add, that monarchy being simple and most obvious to men, whom neither
experience had instructed in forms of government, nor the ambition or insolence of empire had taught to beware of the
encroachments of prerogative or the inconveniencies of absolute power, which monarchy, in succession, was apt to lay claim
to and bring upon them; it was not at all strange that they should not much trouble themselves to think of methods of
restraining any exorbitances of those to whom they had given the authority over them, and of balancing the power of
government by placing several parts of it in different hands” (§107, 168).
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governments the writers and promulgators of civil laws are direct representatives of the people they
interpret civil laws for.
Locke sees a potentially crippling situation in the separation of force and will in governance.
Locke thus poses a difficult question in regards to the adherence of civil laws: What if public good
requires action that is either not interrupted and explicitly promulgated or even directly against
legislative works? In this scenario, strictly following only the explicit guidelines of a constitution and
civil laws may be detrimental to the welfare of the whole. The government may actually be in a situation
where following civil laws may obstruct the purpose of why it exists in the first place. The structure of
this ideal governance would actually be the entity that is harming it. Safeguards placed by the rational
beings would then actually be the cause of their woes. In situations as such, do rationale beings allow the
means to be the very undoing of their desired ends?
2.3

Logic for Executive Prerogative
A proposal to consider in our investigation is whether Locke's means of governance affects the

proper ends that he seeks to provide. Legitimate governance requires enforcement of interrupted and
promulgated civil laws that benefit all. Originally authority of governance was rooted in the paternal
right with fathers of families asserting the collective interests of their tribes and clans. The whole society
was almost entirely under the discretion of an individual or group. After lengthy counts of abuse of
arbitrary discretion, members of the societies sought means to restrict such executive actions. This is the
origins of constitutional and divided governments.
The question remains what is to occur when legislative means are inadequate to achieve the
purpose of governance? Who is best suited to ensure that the community objectives are safeguarded?
The part of governance that readily is available to act preserving society in divided governments
naturally is the executive branch. The Executive is an essential part of the equation to achieving proper
governance.11 Therefore, by design and structure the executive is destined to be the preserver and
vanguard of not only civil laws but society itself. Just as the functionality of the brain is paramount to
the identity of an individual so is the legislature to society. The body still has avoidance measures that
11

In Federalist 70, Alexander Hamilton famously reinforces that, “energy in the Executive is a leading character in the
definition of good government… [and is] essential to the steady administration of the laws” (421).
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react without consciousness to preserve of the whole. The act of preserving society is not just the ability
of the executive but an inherent responsibility of the office.12
2.3.1

The Analogy of The Chief Executive Officer in a Corporation
In order to better understand Locke’s executive prerogative’s relationship between the executor

and other entities an analogy is proposed: The Analogy of The Chief Executive Officer in a Corporation.
This analogy is formed to show the principles at hand and does not attempt to overcome the lack other
values we often provide governance. Accordingly, let us conceive a Chief Executive Officer, associated
board members and shareholders of said corporation. According to Locke’s conception of executive
prerogative, the Chief Executive Officer is enlisted to increase and safe guard the total value of the
corporation’s assets. This being the executive’s highest duty, undoubtedly it should not be questioned
when the Chief Executive Officer circumvents bylaws demonstrating the ability to effectively increase
the value of the collective stock of the group. Promoting the interest of the whole is the primary
objective of the formation of the corporation. It is difficult to grasp why the board or shareholders would
wish to inhibit such actions; after all, the executive is benefiting not only himself, but the board and the
shareholders. Any restraints placed as precautions of mismanagement of the collective assets against the
executive office at this point will only inhibit the objectives of the whole. It is when executive actions of
utilize the assets of the corporation for his own ends, and not collective gain that his tenure should be
reprimanded and his abilities restrained according to Locke. Locke further emphasizes that unneeded
constraints may inhibit execution of actions in times when the board and the shareholders are unable to
direct the executive in the time required. These dire times are moments when executive discretion would
be the only facilitator of action. It is important to note in this analogy that the executive is voted by the
general shareholders, not the board and bringing focus to their interests. Leaving the board members to
legislate the represented interests of the shareholders, all actors freely involved in the corporation as an
instrument of gain, not as a matter of having assets becoming usurped: this would be irrational.

12“That

is, his ability to act may rest on convention and thus on the trust of the people, but his right to do so does not”
(Corbett, 444). This paper adds to Corbett’s lead that is not only a right of the executive but the office’s responsibility to the
people if public good is the goal.
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Most shareholders are not privy to the information readily available to the board members and
especially the Chief Executive Officer. Being consumed usually in their own affairs the shareholders do
notice more personable implications such as their dividend statements, and when discontent and suffrage
at the cost of poor or selfish decisions of executive action reaches a point of the majority, then rightfully
so a movement will be made to unseat the executive.
2.4

Locke’s Six Arguments for Executive Prerogative
John Locke’s most extensive explanations concerning executive prerogative are in chapter 14,

“On Prerogative,” of The Second Treatise of Governments. Sections 159-168 are contentious in the
larger ongoing arguments on the matter of executive prerogative. Original reconstructions of Locke’s
reasoning are offered in order to better understand the concept of prerogative in hopes of bringing clarity
to disputes at hand. The logic breakdown allows for a closer analysis of the assumptions and steps of
reasoning. Additionally, this provides a foundation of comparison permitting an avenue to assess the
implications of these principles. It is the proposal of this paper that there are six fundamental principles
for the conception of Lockean prerogative that are believed to effectively hold the key aspects of his
argument. Here are those principles which the following section further explains the how these
conclusions are developed:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
2.4.1

Executive has the right to act outside of legislation.
Public good, that being as much as possible preservation of all, viz. Fundamental Law
Nature and government requires executive discretion.
The Executive should have power to mitigate/pardon laws where no prejudice to the
innocent (public good).
Executive Prerogative is a device of good and should not be questioned.
The Executive cannot have too much prerogative, that being the power to do good.
By the Law of Nature, all men are judges of prerogative wrongly used and abuse by the
executive will be decided by the majority.

First Principle
Beginning with §159 Locke introduces his chapter On Prerogative explaining the reasoning for

prerogative in relation to the structure of governance. Locke points out having governments with
separated legislative and executives powers, creates a vacuum of sorts. Locke's major premise here is
that executive action is inherently required as a necessary factor to uphold the general welfare of the
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community. The minor premise is that well founded governments are separated. The connection
between major and minor premises for Locke is the assumption that the legislative powers will not be
able to foresee all laws necessary for proper governance. So the good of the community requires action
in times when there is not necessarily direction, so the executive must act faithfully even when the
heading lacks or is not apparent at all. These actions of the executive as outlined are considered to
categorically fall under the guise of executive discretion for Locke. Thus the inclusion of executive
discretion in governments with separated powers is linked to assuring the general welfare of the state. It
is through disjunctive argument then that since the legislature is unable to provide the all necessary laws
to guide the executive decisions, and the good of society requires that the executive act, that there will
be times in which the executive will have to guide his own actions. Times of emergencies are the most
noted instances.
#1 The Executive has the right to act outside of legislation.
 Major premise: Executive power is a right to be used for public good.
 Minor premise: Well-founded governments have legislative and executive branches separate.
The legislature does not foresee all laws which may be useful to the community. 13
2.4.2

Second Principle
Where the first principle argued for the use of executive discretion according to the structure of

governance, the second principle explains in more depth the purpose of executive discretion as means to
fulfilling the ends of not only governance but society itself. The ability of the legislature to provide laws
is also further decreased in this statement, where Locke simply asserts that "many things there are which
the law can by no means provide for." This differs from the first principle where reasoning was the
legislature is “not being able to foresee [all circumstances for laws]" (§159).

13

“Where the legislative and executive power are in distinct hands, (as they are in all moderated monarchies, and wellframed governments) there the good of the society requires, that several things should be left to the discretion of him that has
the executive power: for the legislators not being able to foresee, and provide by laws, for all that may be useful to the
community, the executor of the laws having the power in his hands, has by the common law of nature a right to make use of
it for the good of the society, in many cases, where the municipal law has given no direction, till the legislative can
conveniently be assembled to provide for it. Many things there are, which the law can by no means provide for; and those
must necessarily be left to the discretion of him that has the executive power in his hands, to be ordered by him as the public
good and advantage shall require: nay, it is fit that the laws themselves should in some cases give way to the executive
power, or rather to this fundamental law of nature and government, viz. That as much as may be, all the members of the
society are to be preserved” (Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, §159, 197).
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#2 Public good, that being as much as possible preservation of all, viz. Fundamental Law Nature and
government requires executive discretion.
 Major premise: Because [legislative] laws cannot provide all means. Securing public good
requires that executive discretion.
 Minor premise: The fundamental Laws of Nature and government dictate the preservation of
all.14
The second principle elaborates and further explains its purpose as a means to accomplish the
principled ends. The major premise expands upon the minor premise of the first principle, of the
practical legislative limits to create all laws, and is thus solidifies necessity the executive discretion. In
the second principle the evolution of the concept of executive "discretion" is progressing. The minor
premise works utilizing Locke's standing assertion noted above that "municipal laws of countries, which
are only so far right, as they are founded on the law of nature, by which they are to be regulated and
interpreted” (§12, 120). Meaning civil laws unto themselves do not ultimately direct executive actions.
While the basis executive discretion may be of the necessity of action due to legislature inaction,
prerogative establishes the power to assert will unto the laws themselves. The reasoning is that the
executive would not be acting outside of the scope of properness, actively utilizing his authority for the
greater purpose of governments. Thus not all laws give way to the executive. Lesser laws of the
legislation are always limited by fundamental laws. To Locke, prerogative is justly defined as an ability
to assert will over lesser laws, but still being directed by fundamental ones. This principle successfully
establishes both the power of prerogative and its purpose. It is vitally important to note that this power is
only entrusted as a method to achieve the greater purpose. Locke’s executive prerogative’s objective is
securing the principles of fundamental law, preserving as much as possible all members of society. It is
through chain argument that we reach the conclusion to the concept of prerogative is simply a means to
achieve as much as possible the preservation of all members of society. Modus Tollens of the antecedent
provides insight to how denying the preservation of all members of society, denies the executive its use
of assertion for governance.
14

“This power to act according to discretion, for the public good, without the prescription of the law, and sometimes even
against it, is that which is called prerogative: for since in some governments the lawmaking power is not always in being, and
is usually too numerous, and so too slow, for the dispatch requisite to execution; and because also it is impossible to foresee,
and so by laws to provide for, all accidents and necessities that may concern the public, or to make such laws as will do no
harm, if they are executed with an inflexible rigour, on all occasions, and upon all persons that may come in their way;
therefore there is a latitude left to the executive power, to do many things of choice which the laws do not prescribe” (Ibid.,
§160, 198).
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2.4.3

Third Principle
The third principle has been noted to have some considerable controversy. It is important to point

out that it too follows the purpose of prerogative developed in the previous principles. The major
premise of the third principle progresses the executive powers of prerogative to the mitigation and
pardoning of the civil laws. Asserting the minor premise that strict & ridge observation of the laws may
harm ensuring the preservation of all when not given context when there is no prejudice to society.
#3 The Executive should have power to mitigate/pardon laws where no prejudice to the innocent
(public good).
 Major premise: The Executive should have power to mitigate/pardon laws.
 Minor premise: Strict laws may harm ensuring preservation of all as much as possible
give context when no prejudice.15
The idea that there might be acts of individuals at odds with the established civil laws but
innocent of trespassing the Laws of Nature, is important to analyzing if the terms of a government is for
the public good. The introduction of pardons has been noted by many to indicate that prerogative is not
necessarly indicative to simply the executive of governance, but is applicable to all individuals it is
comprised of.16
By noting the executive’s ability to pardon individuals for breaching civil laws when “no
prejudice to the innocent” highlights that in social contracts the goal is not only for the betterment of the
public good, but for the good of each individual it is composed of. Pardoning addresses the larger
implementation of the principle of good beyond the limits of civil restrains because it allows for
exceptions to be made within the confines of law. Individuals should not have to be unwarrantedly
subject to the reparations of civil law when they did not trespass what is good fundamentally and there is
no loss to the public good. After all, the civil laws are made with the intended purpose of achieving what
is best for all as much as possible. Locke is sure to assert that the good in reference to the individual is
always subordinate the whole, which is always supreme. This can be seen in his famous example of
15

“ For since many accidents may happen, wherein a strict and rigid observation of the laws may do harm; (as not to pull
down an innocent man's house to stop the fire, when the next to it is burning) and a man may come sometimes within the
reach of the law, which makes no distinction of persons, by an action that may deserve reward and pardon; 'tis fit the ruler
should have a power, in many cases, to mitigate the severity of the law, and pardon some offenders: for the end of
government being the preservation of all, as much as may be, even the guilty are to be spared, where it can prove no
prejudice to the innocent” (Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, §159, 197).
16 In “The Extraconstitutionality of Lockean Prerogative” (2006) Ross Corbett denotes how pardoning addresses when
individual breach civil laws but not fundamental laws.
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collateral loss to the individual’s house that is on fire to be immediately pulled down to save the
community.
2.4.4

Fourth Principle
#4 Executive Prerogative is device of good and should not be questioned.
 Major premise: Executive Prerogative is inherently a device of good to benefit the ends
of governance: the public good.17
 Minor premise: People are seldom scrupulous and should not question prerogative.18
The major premise of the fourth principle asserts what Locke states throughout the chapter that

by definition executive prerogative is inherently a benevolent device to better achieve the public good.
The minor premise states that because of peoples’ inabilities to fully grasp all the information necessary
to assess public good along each step of governance, they should not question executive prerogative.
This is because people are not scrupulous and far from rightfully examining executive prerogative.
The argument stands that if the instrument is prerogative then it is by definition good and should
not consequently be questioned. Further importance of the principle is found in implications of its
inverse, that being that arbitrary executive actions are not for the public good, and are thus not the
prerogative, as Locke defines it. If executive actions are not executive prerogative as defined Locke the
term, then it is subject to scrutiny and will be questioned accordingly.
•
•
2.4.5

If Prerogative then good & not questioned.
Inversely, if an executive action is not good then it is not prerogative.

Fifth Principle
#5 The Executive cannot have too much prerogative, that being the power to do good.19
 Major premise: Neither necessary nor useful to limit prerogative.20

17

“Prerogative being nothing, but a power in the hands of the prince to provide for the public good… and the establishing the
government upon its true foundations, is, and always be just prerogative” (Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, §158,
196).
18 “This power, whilst employed for the benefit of the community, and suitably to the trust and ends of the government, is
undoubted prerogative, and never is questioned: for the people are very seldom or never scrupulous or nice in the point; they
are far from examining prerogative, whilst it is in any tolerable degree employed for the use it was meant, that is, for the good
of the people, and not manifestly against it: but if there comes to be a question between the executive power and the people,
about a thing claimed as a prerogative; the tendency of the exercise of such prerogative to the good or hurt of the people, will
easily decide that question” (Ibid., §161, 198).
19 “Though it be very possible, and reasonable, that the people should not go about to set any bounds to the prerogative of
those kings, or rulers, who themselves transgressed not the bounds of the public good: for prerogative is nothing but the
power of doing public good without a rule” (Ibid., §166, 201).
20 “Where [a rational creature] finds a good and wise ruler, he may not perhaps think it either necessary, or useful to set
precise bounds to his power in all things” (Ibid., §164, 199).
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Minor premise: Executive Prerogative is simply a power to do good.21

Locke's fifth principle expands the concept of executive prerogative that is defined in the fourth
principle. Locke points out that since prerogative is inherently good and is nothing more than a means
to accomplish the ends of governance then there are no limitations placed upon it. It does not make
much sense to in any way inhibit an instrument that is effective in achieving the purpose of governance,
society, and people. Locke alludes to the naysayers’ apprehensions stating “government being the good
of the community, whatsoever alterations are made in it, tending to that end, cannot be an encroachment
upon anybody: since nobody in government can have a right tending to any other end” (§163). This
principle in these terms is very difficult to reconcile with the larger debate at hand. It will be addressed
later in the conclusion. It is important to highlight that Locke does pay mind to the overhanging
possibility of a weak prince wrongly using these principles for self-benefit; this was the basis for the
establishment of Constitutions in the first place.22 Locke ends chapter 14 by explaining the one and only
entity with the right and ability to reprimand executive actions, the people, which we now turn to the
sixth principle to better understand.
2.4.6

Sixth Principle
#6 By the Law of Nature, all men are judges of prerogative wrongly used and abuse by the
executive will be decided by the majority.
 Major premise: The Law of nature is a law antecedent and paramount to all laws of men,
and belongs to all, and stipulates rationale beings cannot subject themselves to harm and
reserve the ultimate determination of such to themselves.23
 Minor premise: Illegitimate action will be easily decided by the majority. 24
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“for as a good prince, who is mindful of the trust put into his hands, and careful of the good of his people, cannot have too
much prerogative, that is, power to do good” (Ibid., §164, 200).
22 Robert A Goldwin’s essay in The History of Political Philosophy explains that to Locke the benefits of Prerogative far
outweigh the potential negative effects of its antithesis “the danger inherent in the executive’s prerogative is no less obvious
than the necessity for it. The prerogative has always grown most extensively in the reigns of the best princes. The people trust
a good and wise prince even while he acts beyond the limits of the law, not fearing for their safety because they see that his
purpose is to further their good” (502). Goldwin goes on to highlights the only limitation of executive prerogative is that
“executive discretion is limited only by the proviso that it be used for the public good" (503).
23“But since a rational creature cannot be supposed, when free, to put himself into subjection to another, for his own harm;
(though, where he finds a good and wise ruler, he may not perhaps think it either necessary or useful to set precise bounds to
his power in all things) prerogative can be nothing but the people's permitting their rulers to do several things, of their own
free choice, where the law was silent, and sometimes too against the direct letter of the law, for the public good; and their
acquiescing in it when so done” (Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, §164, 199).
24“Yet they have, by a law antecedent and paramount to all positive laws of men, reserved that ultimate determination to
themselves which belongs to all mankind, where there lies no appeal on earth, viz. to judge, whether they have just cause to
make their appeal to heaven. And this judgment they cannot part with, it being out of a man's power so to submit himself to
another, as to give him a liberty to destroy him; God and nature never allowing a man so to abandon himself, as to neglect his
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The sixth principle soundly establishes only one entity with the true ability to inhibit the misuse
of the power the executive office wields. It is important to note that a difference between Locke and
Hobbes is with Locke the people never transferred their powers to a Leviathan. The executive power is
then an entity that wields the aggregated force of all members of society. Each member still and always
retains their inalienable rights as people. Their consortium in government is for benefit they receive
versus a state where there is infinite arbitrary interpretations of the laws of nature. The formation of
society is for the purpose of promoting the best implementation Laws of Nature for all. The major
premise for the sixth principle is that the Laws of Nature are above all other laws and indivisible and
instilled in all men. The minor premise once again notes that rationale beings cannot forsake themselves
ever and that nature directs them always: to seek self-preservation. This obligation to every man is
assured by each reserving the ultimate determination of their individual welfare. A person’s right to
judge whether one’s preservation is being protected or harmed is an inalienable right. The indivisibility
of self-determination is integral to Locke’s whole work on governance, as can be seen in chapter 13, “Of
The Subordination of The Powers of The Commonwealth,” in §149:
For no man, or society of men, having a power to deliver up their preservation, or consequently
the means of it, to the absolute will and arbitrary dominion of another; whenever anyone shall go
about to bring into such a slavish condition, they will always have a right to preserve what they
have not a power to part with; and to rid themselves of those who invade this fundamental,
sacred, unalterable law of self-preservation (191).
The fourth principle in conjunction with the sixth may seem at first to be contradictory in nature. Upon
further conviction, however, how to properly assess what is was good Locke finds it best to judge acts in
practice, not in theory.25 The safeguard against tyranny is thus when people rightfully assess that
executive actions are not for the public good they are compelled to redress the matter. 26 The misuse of
power on behalf of the executive places himself at war with whole of society, and the people justly
own preservation: and since he cannot take away his own life, neither can he give another power to take it. Nor let anyone
think, this lays a perpetual foundation for disorder; for this operates not, till the inconveniency is so great, that the majority
feel it, and are weary of it, and find a necessity to have it amended” (Ibid., §168, 201).
25 Goldwin discusses this method of assessment of legitimate prerogative in his essay in The History of Political Philosophy
writing “…is there a practical way to ascertain a ruler's intention? It is not always easy to determine whether the law has been
broken, but it is certainly easier to determine whether the law has been broken for a good purpose. Has not Locke made it
uncommonly difficult to distinguish the good prince from the tyrant? Locke does not seem to think so. The important thing is
not how the question would be answered in theory, but how it is judged in practice” (503).
26 “[man] has not liberty to destroy himself," but is governed by reason which obliges him as a rationale being he is bound
forever to "preserve himself, and not to quit his station willfully” (Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, § 6, 117).
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utilize their force as whole to reassert society and proper governance.27 The allowance of tyranny is
contrary to the principles of not only society but to the laws of nature. Being contrary to the laws of
nature is irrational and is also against man’s nature are Locke points out in §163:
If the prince had a distinct and separate interest from the good of the community… the people
under his government are not a society of rational creatures entered into a community for their
mutual good… but are to be looked on as a herd of inferior creatures, under the dominion of a
master…If men were so void of reason, and brutish, as to enter into society upon such terms
prerogative might indeed be, what some men would have it, an arbitrary power to do things
hurtful to the people (199).
2.5

The Fundamental Problem

“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States,
and will to the best of my ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.”
–The U.S. Presidential Oath of Office
The fundamental problem is that there is seemingly a contradiction in the purpose of the office of
the executive. The same entity that is supposed to wield the collective force of society for the public
good is provided an ability to breach those civil laws. Locke argues that although normally, the
executive is subordinate to the legislature by design, the office’s purpose exists for the objective of
upholding the public good, not the legislative acts of even the Constitution. For Locke it is part of the
complexity of the matter. Executive prerogative and public good may seem antithetical to some, but
both are required elements to ensuring public good and both are interlinked and require each other.28
The argument for Locke’s State of Nature requiring governance shows that you can only achieve
public good with governance and to have proper governance means ensuring public good. Likewise, in
order to uphold the public good at times civil laws may not adequately suit the needs executive
prerogative can. Executive prerogative being by definition, discretion of the executive to act only for
public good and is never private.
As previously noted, in §143 Locke writes that “because it may be too great a temptation to
human frailty, apt to grasp at power, for the same persons, who have the power of making laws, to have
27

“I say using force upon the people without authority, and contrary to the trust put in him, that does so, is a state of war with
the people… The use of force without authority, always puts him that uses it into a state of war, as the aggressor, and renders
him liable to be treated accordingly” (Ibid., §155, 194).
28 In his book, Taming the Prince, Mansfield notes “Locke’s political science shows that the modern constitution and the
modern executive are mutually dependent and yet antithetical. Each needs and opposes the other” (181).
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also in their hands the power to execute them” (189). It is an interesting problem to note that, Locke
identifies it as problematic for the Legislature to behold an ability to wield force in governance, but not
for the executive to assert will. Locke goes on to explain in §143 why this temptation may be too great:
whereby they may exempt themselves from obedience to the laws they make, and suit the law,
both in its making, and execution, to their own private advantage, and thereby come to have a
distinct interest from the rest of the community, contrary to the end of society and government:
therefore in well-ordered commonwealths, where the good of the whole is so considered, as it
ought, the legislative power is put into the hands of divers persons, who duly assembled, have by
themselves, or jointly with others, a power to make laws, which when they have done, being
separated again, they are themselves subject to the laws they have made; which is a new and near
tie upon them, to take care, that they make them for the public good (189).
This is where many opponents of executive prerogative have contentions in regards to Locke’s work.29
To fully provide Locke credit, in this seemingly hypocritical notion of providing the executive and not
the legislative the ability to both exert and create binding laws, we must realize that the executive is not
legislating. Instead, at most it is precedence as Locke denotes in his writings. This precedence, unlike
laws can be more easily differentiated between regimes and their associated states. This has been seen in
fluctuations of allowance of executive discretion in America according to public will. Dissolution of
precedence set by administrations of executive prerogative is not afforded the complete context of truly
legislated and promulgated civil laws.
When executive actions are illegitimate then the majority’s decision will undoubtedly entail just
judgment, and react according. Furthermore, since force and will are required elements and the
executive office is always in session and being a single member it has the ability to assert will readily.30
Comparatively, the legislature is multifaceted in terms of membership, with the only means of
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In the 2006 article “The Extracontitutionality of Lockean Prerogative” Corbett writes “So, let us say that it is the people at
large who are to ratify this action. If that is the case, then a law is made by acquiescence rather than consent. To avoid this
possibility, however, we are forced to say that the prince did make a new law, and so that prerogative is not restricted in this
manner. Yet this would be “legislation” of the highest sort, the creation of the constitution, by fait- the people wouldn’t be
involved at all! Locke does not provide us with an easy way to resolve this difficulty, and I do not pretend that this brief
exploration settles this issue” (440).
30 Locke writes in The Second Treatise, “The power of calling parliaments in England, as to precise time, place, and duration,
is certainly a prerogative of the king, but still with this trust, that it shall be made use of for the good of the nation, as the
exigencies of the times, and variety of occasions, shall require: for it being impossible to foresee which should always be the
fittest place for them to assemble in, and what the best season; the choice of these was left with the executive power, as might
be most subservient to the public good, and best suit the ends of parliaments” (§167, 201).
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implementation of force being the executive branch. In terms it is only practical for the executive branch
to seemingly exert both will and force, not the legislature.
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Chapter 3: Alternative Proposal: Rousseau’s Insight
3.1

Rousseau’s Proper Governance

“I have entered upon certain arguments, and risked some conjectures, less in the hope of solving the
difficulty, than with a view to throwing some light upon it, and reducing the question to its proper
form.”
–Rousseau, Preface to The Origin of Inequality
Rousseau’s social contract work follows the footsteps of Locke, who had extended upon Thomas
Hobbes before him. Once again the foundations of governments and, more importantly to Rousseau,
society are required to clearly grasp the logic of his governing elements. Similarly to Locke, the
properness of governance is measured by more than simply the ability to maintain order of a society.
Rousseau, like Locke sees the usefulness in theorizing a state of nature prior to governments. Agreeing
with Locke, Rousseau sees no contentions between people without property. In his State of Nature,
Rousseau envisions great tranquility among people. The likeness between Rousseau and his processors
largely ends there as he draws upon an idea of innocent men free of the blemishes that societies have
marked them with. The people in Rousseau’s state of nature lack most of the ambitions and desires
afforded by Locke to create conflict and therefore any need for governance. For Rousseau the purpose of
his endeavor in political theory is never to find the true source of the evolution of states, instead his
work is almost entirely directed to realizing the factors required for legitimate governance. The Three
Tenets of Proper Governance are proposed to encapsulate the essence of Rousseau’s works to enable a
better understanding of the dynamics related to executive prerogative:
1. Inequalities and ranks among men unjustly enslave people unnaturally.
2. Legitimate authority is morally binding and equally applicable.
3. Governments with injustices lack virtue and morality.
Rousseau’s observations of contemporary societies show grave injustices among men despite his
belief in our benevolent origins. Contrary to the illusion of governments actively partaking in securing
man’s lives and property, it is only false liberties men possess. Man’s resilience in self-preservation is
insufficient to inhibiting a state of submission that entrenches modern governments. Moreover, the
means in which societies are directing their ambitious ends are actually devices enshrouding their failure
of a degeneration of their liberties. In a marked change from the theorists of his day the expansion of
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enlightenment of societies is not improving men, but is actually detracting from his natural luster.
Illegitimate powers under the guise of true authority ever increasingly direct the nations of men.
This is the framework in which Rousseau writes his famous introductory words “Man is born
free; and everywhere he is in chains” (Bk.I, Ch.I, 28).31 The enslavement of men in current societies is
where Rousseau begins his work. Since naturally people exist in a just state of affairs, logically it would
be the unnatural governments that are responsible for the unjust orders among men. Their manufactured
conventions place men in an ill state of affairs. The objective of Rousseau’s greatest work The Social
Contract is to thoroughly investigate how governments could once again achieve justice in societies.
Improving upon governance requires one to take a step back from the perceived proper ends, and
conceptualize a definitely just man uncontaminated by even the foundations of modern governments. It
is from this untainted, natural man, that the deduction of the elements of the liberty of free men can
rightfully be assessed. It follows that governments constituted and administered on these well founded
principles could actualize proper governance.
Rousseau’s major premise to his argument is that naturally all people are without rank each
being his own master and judge of his own accord. Subservient to no other man, there is equality among
them and thus freedom. It is with ranks and divisions among men that people’s natural born rights of
being judge and master of one’s self are lost and the enslavement of men takes place. It follows then that
where there are inequalities and ranks among men that unnatural slavery exists. These are the conditions
of societies that pervade the world. This is the basis for the first tenet of Rousseau’s proper governance:
#1 Inequalities and ranks among men unjustly enslave people unnaturally.32
 Major premise: Naturally men exist justly without rank each being his own judge and
master and therefore equal among each other.33
31

These immortal words emulate the essence of Rousseau’s overall contribution to political theory, eloquently intertwining
the assertions of Ancient and Enlightenment theorists. Enlightenment theorists contend that man was born equal and free,
with no ranks or divisions among men naturally. Unlike his peers, Rousseau holds that societies of his day lack an element of
justice in society not sought since the time of the ancients.
32 Rousseau pointedly challenges the Ancients’ assertions of the innate division of men in The Social Contract stating,
“Aristotle… had said that men are by no means equal naturally, but that some are born for slavery, and others for dominion.
Aristotle was right; but he took the effect for the cause” (Bk. I, Ch. II, 29).
33 Consistently Rousseau follows the premise of enlightenment theorists, advocating no paternal or divine authority to which
man should submit to. It is only without provisions that man is able to truly a sovereign signatory of his consent to
participating in governance, this is the framework used in The Social Contract when Rousseau addresses the nature of man
“his common liberty results from the nature of man. His first law is that man provides for his own preservation, his first cares
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Minor premise: Ranks and division among men are unjust and lead to slavery.

Naturally man is in a state of perfect freedom and equality, without ranking being his own judge
and master. The causation of these perversions of just qualities must be illegitimate, since just
governance is legitimate. Just governance maintains or strengthens men’s natural born right of selfdetermination, and establishes civil liberties reflecting this. To tear man away from being master of his
own accord requires a power without any authority. The enforcement of such subjugation is what
Rousseau calls “force” and is not morally binding.34 It stands that recognition of authority requires a
moral basis of legitimacy of governance. Governments founded and constituted upon foundations
fostering objectives that are partial will always benefit individuals of that social body unequally.35
Accordingly, the second tenet of Rousseu’s proper governance follows:
#2 Legitimate authority is morally binding and equally applicable.
 Major premise: Inequalities require force which is consequently unjust.36
 Minor premise: Justly used force is authority and has a moral basis.
Modern societies’ progressions and emphasis on sciences and capital have come at a cost of
being both morally detached and are promoting inequalities among men. Rousseau asserts that property
is a convention of man and the implementation of civil apparatuses ensures its existence unequally. This
is radically different from other enlightenment theorists of his day that actively advocated otherwise.
Rousseau warns that men are foolish and do not readily see that their liberties and therefore their very

are those which he owes to himself; and, as soon as he reaches years of discretion, he is the sole judge of the proper means of
preserving himself, and consequently becomes his own master” (Bk. I, Ch.II, 28).
34 The difference between force and will, to Rousseau is the same difference between power and authority raised in Antigone
by Sophocles in ancient Greece. Force by definition has no aspect of morality, simply being merely an action, in The Social
Contract Rousseau writes “[it] is a physical power, and I fail to see what moral effect it can have” (Bk. I, Ch.III, 29). The use
of force without legitimate will is unjust, and thus nonobligatory.
35 Footnoted at the very end of the first book of The Social Contract Rousseau notes to the reader that States established on
men’s’ less esteemed qualities, are consequently structurally unsound stating: “Under bad governments, this equality is only
apparent and illusory: it serves only to keep the pauper in his poverty and the rich man in the position he has usurped. In fact,
laws are always of use to those who possess and harmful to those who have nothing from which it follows that the social state
is advantageous to men only when all have something and one too much” (Bk. I Ch IX, 36).
36 On the implementation and existence of slavery Rousseau writes, “If then there are slaves by nature, it is because there
have been slaves against nature. Force made the first slaves, and their cowardice perpetuated the condition” (The Social
Contract, Bk. I Ch. II, 29). This follows the previous assertion above that: inequalities, ranks, among men are unjust and lead
to slavery.
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lives are being mortgaged in the pursuit of improvement, the methods usually used accentuates ranking
of power and influence, diminishing the ideals of proper governance.37
While the chains of people can be heard around the world, so is the key to man’s freedom if
people can realize their state of affairs and establish true orders of self-governance. Actualizing his own
natural born self-determination is what will liberate man’s treacherous conditions. The best forms of
governance therefore invigorate the elements expanding the foundation of freedom since “liberty may be
gained, but can never be recovered” just governance will then only follow with the proper spirit of man
(The Social Contract, Bk. II Ch. VIII, 44).
Additionally, if something is moral then it is just.38 The foundation of Rousseau’s morality,
must preexist any established government of a society if the people’s self-determination consented to
governance in the first place. In order for every individual to claim true legitimacy of prescription of the
terms of the society, the moral compass must be founded within the bounds of the society itself.
Rousseau thus cannot opt to assert the existence of a morality established upon fundamental law,
directing the goals of governance. Instead, what Rousseau proposes is a morality that is founded upon
the collective wills of the individuals of a society. This collective will is called the General Will of a
given society, thereby is just society this is the basis of morality. Fluid and dynamic, justice and right in
a society are determined by all members utilizing their right to self-determination. However, there still
exists the device or method needed to have individuals realize the implications of their actions as a unit.
This being so that they could truly exercise their self-determination and citizenry of the group. This
device is written about extensively by the ancients, but not theorists of Rousseau’s day, this is virtue.
Virtue is essential to just governments as the Rousseau’s third tenet of proper governance shows:
#3 Governments with injustices lack virtue and morality.
1. Major premise: Morality is based on General Will and is just.
2. Minor premise: Virtue actualizes the General Will.
37

The proliferation of the notion of private property and the consequent rise of capitalism is a matter of grave concern for
Rousseau’s degeneration of ideals in societies. Rousseau highlights this in Political Economy, “Nothing is more fatal to
morality and to the Republic than the continual shifting of rank and fortune among the citizens” (Third Principle, 147). In
The Origin of Inequality, Rousseau reasserts that “according to the axiom of the wise Locke. There can be no injury, where
there is no property” (Second Part, 121).
38 Defining what is just is a difficult endeavor as Socrates’ conversation in The Republic with Glaucon and Adeimantus
reminds not only us, but Rousseau. No matter, to Rousseau morality by any interpretation is just in reference to the perceiver.
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3.1.1

The General Will
The consent of individuals to a social contract cannot be binding to all sequential generations,

since the collective will of the members change as the members themselves change over time. It then
follows that even the best governments that are established by the initial group of consenters of a social
contract can be in disillusion with their peoples. The issue of how to justly and correctly administer the
collective interests of all individuals in a community are not only left unresolved by other theorists, but
are actually exacerbated by them. If either simply maintaining stability or property is the basis of
governments then such entities have a flaw design lacking the true best interests of the people. To be
truly just and virtuous governments must govern always utilizing the living social tie mutually
obligatory to all citizens.
Many of the writers during the renaissance and the middle ages of Europe were reserved in their
forthcoming to offer alternative perceptions to what is best attributed to Saint Thomas Aquinas:
Fundamental Law. Fundamental Law is universal and static to man, defining what is right and wrong
divinely; the rightfulness of the legislation of civil laws and governments consequently being assessed
according to this precept. Since fundamental law is largely left to members of a social order’s implicit
interpretations, the perceived and promulgated are rout with differing perspectives on ideologies.
Permitting each individual’s self-determination equal weight requires not merely acknowledgement of
the collective will, but basing the very morality of a society upon the sum total of all members’ wills.39
There is only one way to resolving differing interpretations of morality justly that is the General Will of
the people. Properly constituted governments will be founded and maintained under the direction of the
General will.
Only through the representation of each and every individual’s self determination can authority
have any claim to true legitimacy with each person partaking in their own destiny. Any government that
39

Without the assertion of property being a legitimate purpose for the formation of Social ties, Rousseau has to create a
system of governance that provides both capacity and wills of all individuals. However, in order for this governance to be
ideally just it cannot diminish people’s innate right of self-determination in any manner as Rousseau notes in The Social
Contract “The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the
person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and
remain as free as before. This is the fundamental problem of which the Social Contract provides the solution… Each of us
puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity,
we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole” (Bk. I Ch. VI, 32).
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submits individuals to the wills of other individuals or factions, and not that of the General will is unjust.
Legitimate governance then only exists when there is matrimony of the collective will of the people and
acts of the governing. The General Will is dynamic and relative to a given group of individuals being
always right and never wrong. This social tie, collective will of the people, is the one true sovereign of a
society.
3.2

Best form of Governance

“The different forms of government owe their origin to the differing degrees of inequalities which
existed between individuals at the time of their institution.”
-Rousseau, The Origin of Inequality, Part II
The nostalgia of the gilded Republic of Rome shines the brightest in Rousseuian fancies of
governing structures. While the democracies of ancient Greece are always in his frame of mind to
accomplish equality in governments, their realistic functionality is inhibited by size limitations of
modern states.40 Still, structure is secondary to the purpose of achieving the ultimate goal of governance:
legitimacy of authority. The Social Contract advocates not simply settling on practical means of
stabilizing societies or how to designate the allocations of limited resources, but actively seeks the very
justification of the factors and principles exerting the energy in governance. 41 Yet, the practical
application of governments is not lost to Rousseau; he admits that not all people will be ready for the
most ideal of states. That does not mean that there exists a polarization of best and worst, instead a

40

In Allan Bloom, Willmoore Kendall, and G.D. H. Cole all emphasize the testimony that Rousseau himself highlights in
his own works. Rousseau extensively utilizes the teachings of the ancients throughout his works. This is perhaps best seen
when Rousseau addresses the audience in the introduction of The Origin of Inequalities stating, “I shall suppose myself in the
Lyceum of Athens, repeating the lessons of my masters, with Plato and Xenocrates for judges, and the whole human race for
audience ” (104).
41 To Rousseau works that elaborated upon the optimal structures of governance whether Ancient or Enlightment
misappropriated the true objective of focus in determining ideal governance. Believing that others were not readily seeing
where the true will behind any force rests, Rousseau writes, “But our political theorists, unable to divide Sovereignty in
principle, divide it according to its object: into force and will; into legislative power and executive power; into rights of
taxation, justice and war; into internal administration and power of foreign treaty. Sometimes they confuse all these sections,
and sometimes they distinguish them they turn the Sovereign into a fantastic being composed of several connected pieces…
This error is due to a lack of exact notions concerning the Sovereign authority, and to taking for parts of it what are only
emanations from it… If we examined the other divisions in the same manner, we should find that, whenever Sovereignty
seems to be divided, there is an illusion: the rights which are taken as being part of Sovereignty are really all subordinate, and
always imply supreme wills of which they only sanction the execution” (The Social Contract, Bk. II Ch. II, 37) .
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spectrum of immense and limitless complexities of governance the extent to which there are possible
amalgamations of people.42
The Government of Poland is one of Rousseau’s last notable works granting those interested a
rare opportunity to see application of theory from an esteemed philosopher. The materialization of the
principles of proper governance in an actual proposed state’s constitution are more temperate and
moderate than Rousseau’s youthful zeal led many readers to expect.43 Concessions of sorts were made
on behalf of the guiding concepts of General Will and virtue, to the conservative societal norms of
Poland. Despite, what some argue as shortfalls from the Social Contract, Rousseau’s formalized
governmental proposals are very important to the deduction of what are truly important factors in
achieving the best governance of states. Furthermore, application of theory provides greater
understanding and appreciation of the governing structures necessary for lasting social ties and the
procurement of true liberties. Fervor for freedom in the case of Poland was not a matter of issue; this
fundamentally fortunate circumstance is a basis to expand virtue that binds citizenry of communities to
governance privy to freedoms of man.44
Nevertheless, Rousseau is very frank in his adherence to republican ideals throughout his
writings. Through all Rousseauian works it is clear to see that the contemporary system of states is latent
and properly suited for Republics. In Republics, there are divisions of confederations of providences,
individually sustaining the local administration of faculties of the state. Simultaneously the greater wills
of society are bound and interwoven. Poland’s proposed structure is a Republic, reminiscent of the
42

The idea of the principles of concepts taking different forms in the variety of objects they embody, and all being an
alternative to the ideal, is a testament to Socrates’ divided line. This is a notion that is undoubtedly very familiar to Rousseau,
and might have been taken into account in The Social Contract when he writes, “[that] is unanswerable as well as
indeterminate; or rather, there are as many good answers as there are possible combinations in the absolute and relative
situations of all nations. But if it is asked by what sign we may know that a given people is well or ill governed, that is
another matter, and the question, being one of face admits of an answer” (Bk. III Ch. IX, 59).
43 Willmoore Kendall elaborates on these matters in his introduction of his translated version of The Government of Poland.
44The reason why the youthful fervor is fortunate is noted by Rousseau years earlier in The Origin of Inequality, “Peoples
once accustomed to masters are not in a condition to do without them. If they attempt to shake off the yoke, they still more
estrange themselves from freedom, as, by mistaking for it an unbridled license to which it is diametrically opposed, they
nearly always manage, by their revolutions, to hand themselves over to seducers, who only make their chains heavier than
before” (Dedication, 97).
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Catholic Church’s hierarchy of the cardinals and their ascent to the papacy, notable for very Catholic
peoples.
The Polish people’s particular predicament also allows Rousseau’s previous warnings to be
magnified. The initial urge to provoke the Polish people to aspire to become the greatest and most
powerful of countries is quickly receded by the recognition of what virtues may be lost. 45 The ferocious
aspirations of European mercantilism and capitalism are exactly what Rousseau hopes Poland will
continue to avoid.46 If the newly founded state is directed towards typical European ends it will surely
perish, due to the deterioration of domestic ties and instigation of foreign relations. Poland’s location
between the great European powers and Russia is one of the greatest concerns for Poland. The only sure
way to ensure that the Polish people will survive and even thrive is to base the Polish State not into
physical means or territory, but their very hearts and minds.47 The survival and betterment of Poland is
one that actively challenges Rousseau’s three tenets of Proper Governance since it is a state steeped in
anarchical history.
Poland’s success is dependent upon maintaining the spirit of its people that have “all the fire of
youth.” The proliferation of virtue comes with the education of the population of citizens that is vitally
paramount to societies’ cohesion.48 However, the patronage bestowed upon state officials is not
provided on behalf of promoting the interests of individuals or factions, but the interests of the society as
45

From the beginning of the Rousseau’s recommendations to the Polish people are of moderation and caution stating, “Think
twice, brave Poles! Think twice, lest by seeking to be too well off you make yourselves less well off than you are now. Never
forget, as you dream of what you wish to gain what you might lose… For justice, like good health is a blessing that people
enjoy without being aware of it, that inspires no enthusiasm, and that men learn to value only after they have lost it” (Ch. I,
2). This warning is kept in mind throughout the work as Rousseau sternly states again in Chapter VII of The Government of
Poland, “let us never lose sight of the important maxim: do not change anything, add nothing, subtract nothing, unless you
have to” (43).
46 Rousseau sternly warns, “In a word, money is the weakest and least dependable engine I know of for driving the political
machine toward its object, the strongest and surest for sending it off on a tangent” (The Government of Poland, Ch. XI, 70).
47 This is perhaps one of the most famous lines in The Government of Poland, “A good and sound constitution is one under
which the law holds sway over the hearts of the citizens” (Rousseau, Ch. I, 4).
48 While virtue is key, education is the best method of its administration, like the Ancients Rousseau states in Political
Economy that, “It is not enough to say to the citizens, be good; they must be taught to be so; and even example, which is in
this respect the first lesson, is not the sole means to be employed; patriotism is the most efficacious: for, as I have said
already, every man is virtuous when his particular will is in all things conformable to the general will, and we voluntarily will
what is willed by those whom we love. It appears that the feeling of humanity evaporates and grows feeble in embracing all
mankind” (Bk. II., 143).
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a whole. Analogous to Socrates’ Republic and Lycurgus’ Sparta, fervor of individuals is translated to
patriotism of men who are “Guardians of law” for the entire community.
Aspiring to craft as much as possible proper governance, public officials are ideally only
entrusted with the authority to legislate and execute the wills of the populations they represent. It thus
follows that all public officials are then dually inscribed as only stewards, merely embodying the wills
of the people.49 Camaraderie and fellowship is the ultimate purpose in devising the structure of states.
Through securing the liberation of tendencies that usually divide people freedom is found.50 If any
public official wish to extenuate their vested abilities beyond which an office is constituted they do so
usurping such powers. It follows usurpation of powers is this never legitimate, or is it?
3.3

Rousseau on the Use of Executive Prerogative

“All have pledged their lives and properties for the defence of each, in order that the weakness of
individuals may always be protected by the strength of the public, and each member by the whole
State.”
– Rousseau, The Origin of Inequality, Part II
On the explicit terms of a Rousseauian legitimate social compact there exist no room for any
conception similar to Locke’s executive prerogative.51 In a structure where virtue and liberty are
dependent upon the equality of all individuals as the means of social cohesion, it is not surprising that
state officials are not privy to exemptions as such. All state facilities are enlisted as merely stewards of
the General Will first as citizens and secondly as officers. Any state official legitimately fulfilling the
terms of their placement does not hold legitimate discretion beyond the extent of the explicitly stated
49In

The Social Contract it is critically important that all force exerted in legitimate governance have the will of the people
behind it; any government office then “is simply and solely a commission, an employment, in which the rulers, mere officials
of the Sovereign, exercise in their own name the power of which it makes them depositaries” (Rousseau, Bk. III Ch. I, 49) .
50 In Political Economy Rousseau stresses the basis required for society ties stating, “All these precautions will be
inadequate, unless the rulers go still more to the root of the matter. I conclude this part of public economy where I ought to
have begun it. There can be no patriotism without liberty, no liberty without virtue, no virtue without citizens; create citizens,
and you have everything you need; without them, you have nothing but debased slaves, from the rulers of the state
downwards” (Bk. II, 145).
51 Locke’s doctrine of executive prerogative was written following the logic of assurance that it is and could only ever be a
necessary tool enabling and ushering in the ends of governance, public good. It is through the use of fundamental law that
Locke is able to circumvent the ordinary devices of the social contract in the name of justly used executive action. See
previous chapter for further details.
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General Will of the people.52 The explicitly stated will of the people is civil laws and Constitutions of
governments.
Following the logic put forth it seems clear that Lockean executive prerogative is, on face value,
wholly incompatible with Rousseau’s principles of proper governance. Rousseau does not have any
chapters, in any of his works, which are dedicated to legitimate discretionary acts of state officials. To
advocate executive prerogative would be sanctioning the use of two wills to govern: that of the general
will and that of the executive will, in corporate or individual capacities, consequently there would exist
two sovereigns.53 In the Dedication of The Origin of Inequality, Rousseau denounces any individual
acting beyond the limits of law:
I should have wished then that no one within the State should be able to say he was above the
law; and that no one without should be able to dictate so that the State should be obliged to
recognize his authority. For, be the constitution of a government what it may, if there be within
the jurisdiction a single man who is not subject to the law, all the rest are necessarily at his
discretion (96).
Any member of society acting outside of the capacities of that society is exerting force against the will
of that society. Acting without the General Will inherently affords an actor an unequal degree of selfdetermination.54 The right of self-determination is the basis of all liberties and the measure of equality,
legitimate governance existing only with these pillars. What if there were events that required actions of
an actor to outside or against the laws of the states?

52

“On this view, we at once see that it can no longer be asked whose business it is to make laws, since they are acts of the
general will; nor whether the prince is above the law, since he is a member of the State; nor whether the law can be unjust,
since no one is unjust to himself; nor how we can both free and subject to laws, since they are but registers of our wills”
(Rousseau, The Social Contract, Bk. II Ch VI, 41).
53 “The dominant will of the prince is, or should be, nothing but the general will or the law; his force is only the public force
concentrated in his hands, and, as soon as he tries to base any absolute and independent act on his own authority, the tie that
binds the whole together begins to be loosened. If finally the prince should come to have a particular will, there would be, so
to speak, two Sovereigns, one rightful and the other actual, the social union would evaporate instantly, and the body politic
would be dissolved” (Ibid., Bk. III Ch. I, 50).
54 “I have already said that there can be no general will directed to a particular object. Such an object must be either within or
outside the State. If outside, a will which is alien to it cannot be, in relation to it, general; if within, it is part of the State, and
in that case there arises a relation between whole and part which makes them two separate begins, of which the part is one,
and the whole minus the part the other. But the whole minus a part cannot be the whole; and while this relation persists, there
can be no whole, but only two unequal parts; and it follows that the will of one is no longer in any respect general in relation
to the other” (Ibid., Bk I. Ch VI, 41).
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As seen in the Government of Poland, Rousseau’s pragmatism and ideals are often
misunderstood, the former as being hypocritical and the latter being intangible as the Socratic Republic.
Yet, it is with careful reading that Rousseau’s contribution to the topic of executive prerogative is more
than it appears to be on the surface. Rousseau admits the salient fact that initiates Locke’s origin of
prerogative, that there will be situations in which the executive must utilize force outside the explicit
will of the people. In The Social Contract, Rousseau concedes the following despite his extensive
writings of the illegitimacy of unauthorized executive action:
The sacred power of the laws should never be arrested save when the existence of the country is
at stake. In these rare and obvious cases, provision is made for the public security by a particular
act entrusting it to him who is most worthy. This is commitment may be carried out in either of
two ways, according to the nature of the danger (Bk. IV Ch. VI, 75).
This concession seems to be against the spirit of the rest of Rousseau’s entire social contract work. It is
through admitting circumstances that may present the requirement to the circumvention of law that
ambiguity and intrigue is raised.
In chapter IX, “Specific Causes of Anarchy,” of The Government of Poland Rousseau reviews
issues that have troubled Polish governance in the past. While there were several circumstances that
worked against achieving better governance, a mobilization of “great energies” acted as “new means of
preserving the constitution.” In the centuries prior to Rousseau’s writings, in times of great political
unrest in Poland a factions of entities seized governance when the state was otherwise unable to perform
its duties. These entities further our debate by raising the question even for Rousseau of the necessity of
executive discretion to act in saving a failing state. These forces were varied and came to be known as
“confederations.” To the authorities they displaced, the confederations were often seen as rebellious
unions usurping power of the state. Despite such blatant acts of dissolution of laws, Rousseau actually
champions the confederation acts stating:
Indisputably, an interval of violence in the life of the republic… seems to me a political
masterpiece… and I greatly fear that [the republic of Poland] will not long survive the
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confederations should you decide to abolish them… Do you wish to strip the republic of the very
resource that has just saved it from extinction (The Government of Poland, Ch. IX, 60)?
It seems counter intuitive that Rousseau is a proponent of an extra-constitutional means of interim
executive action.
The reasoning behind this apparent disjunction in Rousseau’s logic is increasing perplexing
when taking into account the chastising of lawful acts of the Polish legislature. At same time
confederations formed, the Polish Diet also granted each member the ability of “liberum veto,” the
capability to not only veto, but to close session nullifying all acts of that current legislature. Although,
the liberum veto was still an active tool during the times of Rousseau’s writings he fiercely contends
that:
It is absurd, whatever the circumstances, for a single member to be able to bring the Diet’s
activities to a stop, or for the withdrawal or protest of a single deputy, or even several deputies,
to dissolve the assembly and so annul the authority of the sovereign. You must abolish the
barbarous right that makes these things possible, and punish by death [italics added] any man
who might be tempted to exercise it” (Ibid, 58).
It is quite bewildering that Rousseau manages to concurrently praise extra-legal actions of executive
nature and condemn acts based on civil decrees of the legislature. The question then remains how and
why would Rousseau take such a position?
The answer to Rousseau’s seemingly disoriented behavior comes from his very understanding of
the basis of legitimate governance. While proper governments depends on virtue facilitating cohesion of
the will of the people, in which justice is founded upon, it is still something more fundamental that
produces righteous states. Self-determination, the natural right of people, is essential to self-governance
and maintaining an undivided sovereign and thus the legitimacy of governments. Each person is born
free because they are innately sovereign, this is possible since they are the lowest common denominator
of the embodiment of force and will in one entity. The sovereign component in governance is will, and
force is merely a means to accomplish such, as Rousseau states in Political Economy:
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Government, and the supreme authority, which I call Sovereignty; a distinction which consists in
the fact that the latter has the right of legislation, and in certain cases binds the body of the nation
itself, while the former has only the right of execution, and is binding only on individuals (138).
There then is vindication for Rousseau’s position on actions of the Polish Diet and confederations in
regards to proper governance. The individual members of the Polish Diet consistently inhibited the
activities of the legislature doing a tremendous injustice to the Polish people. The obstruction of
legislative acts is the obstruction of the very will of people: the most important aspect to just
governance. By stalling the legislative process the Diet paralyzes governance disjoined the state’s
sovereignty. Comparatively, when the confederations are commissioned and perform outside of
ordained law, they enable the consummation of the union and will and force, restoring the rightful
sovereign. The confederation acted very unusually as executive agents against the usurpation of the will
of the people. Without such actions the Polish Government would have almost surely fallen to tyranny,
perhaps even worse despotism or true anarchy.
The potential for tyranny to have occurred under the reigns of confederations, or other similar
executive actions of force is not lost on Rousseau. 55 If the confederations retained the place of the
rightful sovereign, the Polish people would have been positioned in a situation that required further
evasive action. An already debilitated state is very susceptible to slavery as Rousseau defines it through
tacit compliance. Usurpers of sovereignty realizing the power they have or believing they actually are
acting in the best interest of the people regularly indulge in their newly gained positions. In The Social
Contract Rousseau denotes that state emergencies are often a cloak for illegitimate executive actions and
more importantly the usurpation of will of the people:
Usurpers always bring about or select troublesome times to get passed, under cover of the public
terror, destructive laws, which the people would never adopt in cold blood. The moment chosen
is one of the surest means of distinguishing the work of the legislator and that of the tyrant (Bk.
II Ch. X, 46).
55

“The confederations, because of the executive power they carry with them, will always possess- in moments of dire needa vigor, a capacity to act and act quickly, that are out of the question for the Diet for this reason: it must proceed more
deliberately, with great formality, and cannot do anything irregular upsetting the constitution” (Rousseau, The Government of
Poland, Ch. IX, 60).
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In the case of Poland, it is only the fact that the confederations were benevolent enough to relinquish
power after obtaining it that tyranny did not ensue. Notwithstanding Rousseau’s admiration, limiting the
confederations potential powers and thereby potential for adverse effects is critically important to the
Polish people in the future for Rousseau. From this though the principle avoidance for legitimate
governance is not particular applications of the laws but the displacement of people’s wills.
In order to more fully grasp Rousseau’s allowance of executive prerogative it is necessary to
think of force and will extendedly. Let us thus further analyze the principles of these concepts: An
individual acting outside of his or her own will, exerting force unconsciously, having an unmanageable
will would almost surely raise questions of their health. A person of sound mind is said to have full
function of his thoughts, and is therefore a wholly sovereign entity in his own right. Our bodies are
simply the means to carry out the wills of our minds and undoubtedly affect our experiences and
consequently our identities. However, our physic is not the true testament of our self-determination.
Moreover, paralysis of one’s body does not equate to one’s self ceasing to exist, however, if one’s
mental capacities suffer such inflictions that make it largely inoperable the completeness of that person
would come into question. This relationship of will and force is the same for governance. The will of the
people is the true sovereign of the political entity; force is embodied in the structure of the state.
Executive prerogative in such context is never legitimate, as it is the unconscious actions outside
of will. Force and will being two separate principles, such as one’s mind and body, Rousseau only
admits that executive discretion should be nothing more than a reflex to danger. Our bodies have a
proactive and reactive system of nerves that do not always require explicit conscious thought to
function. This is often helpful for us in our everyday lives. No matter, the inherent problems of multiple
sovereigns in the same state, is best illustrated by this question: Would you be comfortable sharing your
body with another personality inside of you? Executive prerogative and its particularizing of laws in
application is not the predominant trespassing against the people: the usurpation of their wills is.
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Executive discretion can thus be for the ultimate public good, even to Rousseau when the unleashed
powers it possesses are returned in favorable conditions to the people.
3.4.1

The Unavoidable Problem

“Government must be powerful enough to dominate the particular wills of the citizens but not powerful
enough to dominate the general will or the laws.”
-Allan Bloom in his essay “Jean-Jacques Rousseau”
Like a star, whose core collapses due to the lack of sufficient substance for fusion and intense
gravity that incidentally directed those very particles to coalesces at its birth, so is the death of
governments. The inherent unavoidable flaw of governments is fully known and elaborated upon by
Rousseau in his Social Contract.56 The death of governments rests in the very reason for their existence.
There needs to be a means to combine the wills behind a legitimate collaboration of force, this is the
essence of every social compact.
The unification of individual self-determinations evolves to an altruistic determination of all
members. The bonds of the social ties function with cooperation wielding greater abilities of not only
power but will. So long as the good of the entity as a whole is held in commons and the will of the
people is the true sovereign there exists a perfect communion of society and state. The problem is that
the marriage of force and will is one of great difficulty to maintain, and easily lost as unequal matters of
governance prevail. The equality of weight of the intertwined interests is fragile, and their strengths and
frailties readily present themselves in administration. In time, the will of individuals and more often
factions (what Rousseau calls corporate) takes precedence governing at the detriment to general welfare
of the people. This degenerative process is usually in the name of legitimacy but is actually the erosion
and detraction of such. The legislature usurping the general will people through decrees and the
56

“As the particular will acts constantly in opposition to the general will, the government continually exerts itself against the
Sovereignty. The greater this exertion becomes, the more the constitution changes and as there is in this case no other
corporate will to create an equilibrium by resisting the will of the prince, sooner or later the prince must inevitably suppress
the Sovereign and break the Social treaty. This is unavoidable and inherent defect which, from the very birth of the body
politic, tends ceaselessly to destroy it, as age and death end by destroying the human body” (Rousseau, The Social Contract,
Bk III. Ch. X, 60).
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executive by tacit acts.57 The dissolution of a state occurs at some point when the will controlling
governance is not that of the people.58 This disenfranchisement of people self-determination is nothing
less than enslavement.

57

“The will, when declared, is an act of Sovereignty and constitutes law: in the second, it is merely a particular will, or act of
magistracy- at the most a decree” (Ibid., Bk II. Ch.II, 36).
58 In “Jean-Jacques Rousseau,”Allan Bloom writes, “the death of a government occurs when the particular wills substitute
themselves for the general will. This can lead either to anarchy or tyranny- anarchy when the individuals go of each in his
own direction, tyranny when the private will of a single man directs the government. The entire political problem is, in sum,
to establish the proper relation between the particular and the general will” (576).
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Chapter 4: Conclusion: Operationalization and Assessment
4.1

Extraneous Variables

With John Locke we come to the constitutional executive we think we know. We think we know it
because it is familiar to us, but its very familiarity restricts our knowledge because it hinders our
imagination. In fact, we know no other than the constitutional executive- except his alter ego, the
unconstitutional executive.
– Harvey Mansfield, Taming The Prince
The analysis provided in the two previous chapters provide a basis for derivations that form an
original theory concerning executive prerogative. The principles and tenets of Locke and Rousseau were
refined and combined accounting for the differences in the approaches of governance stemming from the
perspectives of importance in matters of governance. Three maxims of executive prerogative are
proposed in hopes of better understanding the complexities inherent in this concept that has been
lengthily debated:
1. Executive Prerogative is Executive Action without the explicit will of the people.
2. Executive Prerogative is a concept inalienable from governance in which force and will is
indivisible.
3. Issues of Executive Prerogative are people possibly being unable to properly determine their own
preservation and their inability to mutually preserve their own determination.
The importance of prioritizing governance to Locke and Rousseau is most fundamental to understanding
their differences: one is concerned most with force and the other with will. The divisions of governance
arouse from the desire to separate the entities of will and force. Force is the executive branch of a
government. The legislature in governance is supposed to be the formal representative of the will of the
citizens of that society.
Of the six principles proposed to encapsulate Locke’s executive prerogative only one has to do
with the will of the people. Locke’s arguments of governance generally are driven by energy. The most
important goal in governance and individuals is self-preservation, and the improvement of such
conditions as liberty and property of the citizens, the latter largely assessing the former. The initial basis
for consent to be governed is a means used in aspiration to best achieve these ends. Locke investigates
the logical placement of the tangible ambitions of individuals’ in greater societies. The ends of
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protecting life, liberty and property directing authorities is assured and justified by fundamental laws.
The self-determination is inalienable always remaining in the hearts of men so that they may rightfully
judge when peril presents itself.
In comparison, Rousseau places self-determination at the forefront of explaining the concept of
governance, not simply its objectives. It is in respect to the right of self-determination that the legitimacy
of governance is properly assessed. Might and the aggregation of forces and property are all secondary
to the validity of self-determination in governance. Force is not seen as a dominant issue of concern, as
Rousseau pointes to in Poland’s uneasy placement in the Russian periphery. The failure of people to
embrace spirit and assert their wills is the greatest concern in governance. Lack of self-determination is
prominent in the prevalence of people being subservient to the wills of others. All civil rights and
liberties are based off the original right of self-determination. The will of the public good is the will of
the people and is always supreme. The legislature is enlisted as the liaison between the people and the
creation of civil laws. Logical necessity affords Rousseau the use executive prerogative since there will
be times that require action without the explicit will of the people. Whether the people retrieve their
usurped essence of their self-governance will determine if the governance is legitimate.
The definition of the term “executive prerogative” that is most consistently associated with
Locke is incorrect. What is being disputed by investigators of executive prerogative has a sinister
characteristic that may be detrimental to the health of nations and is not derivable through Locke’s
definition. Often times our frame of mind can inherently affect our perspectives and conclusions we
reach on subject matters. A tangent of sorts is provided for further illustration of such, the age of
enlightenment brought forth riveting revelations to mankind. About four years after the publication of
The Second Treatise of Government, one of history’s most esteemed scientists, Sir Isaac Newton, made a
monumental contribution to the world. Following the works of Galileo and Copernicus, The Principia
changed people’s understanding of how the universe works around them forever. Newton intertwines all
substance in the universe with the recognition that gravity acts upon all objects similarly no matter the
size.
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For over 200 years, the works of Sir Isaac Newton stood unrivaled in scope and depth to
explaining the physics of the known universe. At the turn of the twentieth century, Albert Einstein added
another dimension to explaining why the forces of gravity were acting upon the objects of differing scale
across the universe. Over the course of a decade his works came to be known as the Theory of
Relativity, which offered an entirely new way to think of the very fabric of space and previously
believed to be static concepts such as time. In doing so, Einstein in many ways aided in supporting
Newton’s laws, however he also challenged physics at the subatomic level. Einstein’s works
consequently initiated the birth of another field of study, quantum physics. The inferences of his theory
and the field of quantum physics plagued Einstein who had sought a universal explanation concerning
all objects. Einstein spent the last years of his life attempting to resolve the disconnection between his
works and his faith, but to no avail, as he was never able to overcome what could be derived from the
brilliance of his works. Newton’s works are logically incapable of being able to deduce the mechanics of
quantum physics and Einstein despised its admission, but that does not mean that quantum physics does
not exist.
The six fundamental principles of executive prerogative proposed are logically impenetrable to
malicious executive actions. Locke establishes morality on fundamental law that is the ends of
governments where the means to achieving such are simply tools to the effect. The notion of inhibiting
the executive for what evil could happen is thwarted by the argument of what greatness that could be
lost in governance where the innate compass of fundamental laws guide man. Fundamental laws are
thought to be universally applicable to executives and individuals alike, if at any point there are actors
behaving outside of these forces the natural order of things shall definitively correct the course of
governance.
Rousseau is dramatically different seeing morality founded upon the very actors themselves, in a
system where the relativity of righteousness is both means and ends unto itself. All actors shall behave
within the guiding principles, since governing legitimacy is based on such. Yet, when destabilization
threatens the entire structure the entity that is entrusted with the executive action is bestowed a duty to
perform that may be outside the governing structure. The equality of self-determination is superseded by
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executive prerogative’s positioning preserve the entire commons. It is in the conditions of national
emergences that the executive office by its nature may be put in a situation where the duty to exert force
maybe without the explicit general will, so that the state may be saved. The execution of discretion
outside of the laws by any citizen is behavior that makes the state not mutually applicable to all the
members, breaching the regular principles of equality required in sovereignty. When properly used,
executive prerogative usurps sovereignty to save it, as was the case of the Polish confederations.
Rousseau chooses to not extendedly describe the contradictory principle of executive discretion in ideal
social orders that base the righteousness of governance on its means. The very acquisition of executive
discretion to act outside of the bounds of the general will, describes circumstances of non-benevolent
actions according to the rest of the Rousseau’s argument.
Rousseau bases morality on general will and thus relative to the people in a society. Selfdetermination legitimizes governance, but what if an emergency presented itself that required the
executive to act without the explicit general will of the people? Then the executive acting outside of the
explicit general will of the people is acting particular in nature breaching the very ideals of governance
to which that office is entrusted to uphold. Incidentally this is against the general will of the people
expansively. The general will being the basis of morality means that the executive will also be acting
unmorally in his line of duty. At this point, the officer will simultaneously be acting righteous and
unrighteous. What is perhaps most interesting is that Rousseau’s works allow for the admission of
executive prerogative that would logically seem negative yet has the ability to be beneficial to society.
Acting both without the explicit general will and for the general will, creating circumstances where the
mutuality of the self-determination is not the best allotment of people. This is a conundrum of
Rousseau’s governing dynamics that the executive is provided an ability to utilize the individual or
corporate will as a substitute of the general will to direct the force of the community. Executive
prerogative is then concurrently a major safe guard and contributor to the dissolution of legitimate
governance. The act of executive prerogative is not what determines the failure of a state, however, it the
retention of usurped will of the people. Usurped will is antecedent to the enslavement of people and
illegitimate governance that pervades that world.

46

According to Locke the history of constitutional governance has largely evolved from the
wanting to limit executive powers of arbitrary discretion over the course of time. The discretionary
component is not the reason for this progression, it was the arbitrariness. Locke’s executive prerogative,
on his own account, sets precedence for the powers held in that office. Locke’s argument is logically
historically and sound. It is Locke’s barometer of justly used executive prerogative in comparison to the
limitless discretion that lacks credibility. In contemporary forms of governments the executive branch is
supported by bureaucracies and standing armies, refracting the perception of righteousness and inherent
authority over the course of time. What would have definitely been unallowable by initial population
may be common place to later generations. “The ultimate determination” of man that reserves divine
judgment may not have challenged the progression of the reigns of weak princes and usurpation of selfgovernance due to a superficial perception of preservation. Rousseau argues that there is a difference
between the judgment of lacking self-preservation and self-determination, so that individuals may react
in peril of immediate danger to their lives but may be content in situations they have little determination
over.59 One can see while the people’s judgment may be inalienable, it can still be misled. Since the
executive is the antecedent to most security information it will be may be situated many times to
dispense the information the public is receiving. This intrinsic role as an executive is exactly the reason
why Locke afforded the position prerogative. People perceiving a state that is strong, may fail to realize
their nation is weak. Does this then implicate Locke’s sentiment on the people being the true and
effective check on prerogative?60
There seems to be inherent problems of executive prerogative, in the aspects of Locke and
Rousseau. There is an inability to properly amend executive actions utilizing the solely the arguments of
Locke as your basis, one would be as successful as utilizing Newton’s Principia to explain the nature of
subatomic particles. Similarly, emergencies may require the executive to act against the general will.

59 A large basis for the enslavement of people is the assertion that people are not adequate judges in the difference between
self-preservation and self-determination. In The Social Contract Rousseau writes, “Tranquility is found also in dungeons; but
is that enough to make them desirable place to live in” (Bk. I, Ch. IV, 30)?
60 “If there comes a question between the executive power and the people, about a thing claimed as prerogative; the tendency
of the exercise of such prerogative to the good or hurt of the people, will easily decide that question” (Locke, The Second
Treatise of Government,§161, 198). This is the basis for reasoning is provided in the sixth principle of Lockean Principles
proposed.
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Ironically, Rousseau’s executive discretion not bounded by a basis of good provides much greater
discretion than Locke’s conception.
Through the arguments of Locke and Rousseau this thesis holds that executive prerogative is
more justly defined as a concept inalienable from governance in which force and will is indivisible.
Furthermore, there exist provisions for people possibly to be unable to properly determine their own
preservation that is confounded by their inability to mutually preserve their own determination. Neither
Locke nor Rousseau’s accounts of executive prerogative are entirely sufficient in wholly practical and
theoretical terms. Together Rousseau and Locke’s works provide greater understanding of the nature of
prerogative’s irreconcilable identity of an entity indivisible of will and force, where preservation and
determination are one and capable of both extending and degenerating the life of states.
4.2

Presidentialists & Constitutionalists

“Overleaping the law is of greater evil than a strict adherence to its imperfect provisions.”
-Thomas Jefferson in a letter to John B. Colvin
In the affiliated literature, categorizations of the perspectives of executive prerogative are often
either “Presidential” or “Constitutional.” At times the definitions of each can be difficult to grasp for
various reasons. In order to deal with the problem of definition, the following operationalizations shall
be used in this section. The first consists in the definition proposed by a group known as Presidentialists,
who see executive discretion as the set of abilities that are an inherent right of the office, not contingent
upon the vested powers of civil establishments. The second definition is that proposed by a group known
as Constitutionalists, who believe executive prerogative is limited by the associated civil laws and state
constitutions, so that any power the executive exerts shall be dually afforded only by such avenues. This
second definition is clearly much more restrictive.
Locke is often referred to by both camps as an authority on the topic, both conceding executive
prerogative’s genesis as an emergency based “privilege.”61 Executive discretion’s transformation from a
reactionary measure to something pertaining to a right of the office is usually the grounds for debate
between the two sides. Constitutionalists attempt to either diminish discretionary executive actions or
61

The word privilege has quotation marks do to the difference in perspectives of executive prerogative being either a right or
a duty according to the choice categorization: Presidentialists the former and Constitutionalists the latter.
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reason that civil laws have the capacity to contain executive prerogative. Oppositely, Presidentialists see
executive prerogative as part of the nature and functions of executive offices. As Arnhart noted in his
article there may also be a mix between these two perspectives that see the executive discretion as both
inside and outside the limits of civil laws. There exist many more differences of both perspectives worth
further investigation.
Presidentalists usually argue that “higher obligations,” such as those of fundamental law or those
necessitated by the public good are what empowers executive actions, even when these are above and
beyond the law. As noted many Presidentialists and Constitutionalists, including Thomas Jefferson,
explain executive prerogative is a “necessity, of self-preservation, of saving our country when in
danger.” Thomas Jefferson goes on to write in the Letter to John B. Colvin that “to lose out country by a
scrupulous adherence to written law… absurdly sacrificing the end to the means” (1231). Most
Presidentialists argue that the executive offices have rights inherently beyond that of the civil laws they
entrusted to enforce. Some Presidentialists follow the logic of the fifth principle of executive prerogative
of this thesis, that the executive office is a means to achieve the greater ends of governance and can thus
consequently be expanded upon. Asking a basic question to Consitutionalists, what is more important
the set of fundamental principles a state is founded on or the constituted laws of a said state? In this
perspective, executive prerogative is oriented towards governments’ ultimate purpose, to benefit the
people, justified by almost any means, except those sacrificing the ends. 62 Presidentialists contend that it
is difficult to conceive a list of executive limitations that would facility and encompass all potential
requirements of action, and thereby also negate the very necessity of its provision in the first place. In
this vacuum of necessity and potential harm, in brittle structure of governance, the right of presidential
authority rests. The evolution of executive prerogative being reactive to harmful circumstances to
becoming proactive and expansionary is readily apparent in the proposed six principles of Lockean
prerogative. The best executive, a “God-like prince,” intertwines his interests with those of the whole, so
that the fruits of his discretion can be enjoyed by all.

62

In History of Political Philosophy Goldwin’s essay “John Locke” goes on to say “the prospect of the resistance of the
people when they feel themselves in danger is the only effective limit on the use of the prerogative. A wise prince
understands this limit and always avoids actions that make the people suspect his intentions” (507).
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Locke highlights the history of constituted governments to diminish the use of executive
prerogative under weak princes. Constitutionalists point to the divisions of force and will as not to be
simply a gesture, but a mandate from the citizens consenting to be governed. Governments ought to
follow the sovereign. The sovereign is the will of the people. Then the logical conclusion is that
government must then follow the will of the people.63 Authors, such as Arthur Schlesinger, attempt to
prescribe Locke’s executive prerogative to only handle emergencies where providing legislative
direction would otherwise be impractical.64 The expansion of arbitrary executive discretion even in
times of emergences creates great anxiety with Constitutionalists, as the potential harm is immense. The
only absolute inalienable check on poorly used executive prerogative, according to Locke and
Presidentalists is the judgment of the people. Constitutionalists see this as an ineffectively device to
outweigh the potential costs.65 The difficulties of Constitutionalists are the same issues Locke grapples
with in §13 of his own work stating:
I easily grant, that civil government is the proper remedy for the inconveniencies of the state of
nature, which must certainly be great, where men may be judges in their own case, since it is
easy to be imagined, that he who was so unjust as to do his brother an injury, will scarce be so
just as to condemn himself for it: but I shall desire those who make this objection, to remember,
that absolute monarchs are but men; and if government is to be the remedy of those evils, which
necessarily follow from men's being judges in their own cases, and the state of nature is therefore
not to be endured, I desire to know what kind of government that is (121).
Arnhart’s protest against Schlesinger’s concession of the extra-constitutionality of executive prerogative
emphasizes that arbitrary governance outside of the consented rule of law set is tyranny. 66 This being

63

This logic is regularly used among contemporary notions of nation states, in The Social Contract Rousseau writes, “the
state exists by itself, and the government only through the sovereign, thus the dominant will of the prince is, or should be,
nothing but the general will or the law; his force is only the public force concentrated in his hands” (Bk. III Ch. I, 49).
64 The emergency based executive prerogative only is widely advocated by Constitutionalists such as Arnhart who writes “In
some cases, Locke argued, especially in times of emergency… it is the duty of the executive to act according to his own
discretion…” (121). Similarly, Fatovic states, “The emergency powers… are supposed to be temporary exercises of
extraordinary power limited both in duration and in scope of length and severity of the crisis” (440).
65 “But since exceeding the bounds of constitutional or legal powers on the pretext of serving the people has been the
constant practice of tyrants from time immemorial, ‘the public good’ seems a dangerously vague test and inadequate of
whether the prerogative is being properly used. The good prince and the tyrant are alike in that they both act outside the law
and even contrary to it. The difference between them lies entirely in whether their lawlessness is beneficent or the opposite”
(Goldwin, 503).
66 Extralegal prerogative is also granted by Fatovic and most recent theorists on the topic. Arnhart writes the following: “We
might want to insist that we have a government of laws, not of men, and therefore that we obey our rulers only so long as
they themselves are under the rules. To allow the President to govern according to his discretion, we might say, would be to
substitute the arbitrary will of one person for the impersonal rule of law, and this would be tranny” (121).
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consistent with Locke’s argument that state officials require obedience only to the degree they are
empowered with in the office they hold.67 Furthermore, the ideal of legislative supremacy in governance
that is highly advocated by Locke seems to be questionable in his allotment of executive limits.68
The works of John Locke forged the foundations of governance and also allowed for the
progression of thought such as the free market systems of Adam Smith. Likewise, The United States
founding fathers were without a doubt greatly influenced by Locke, taking his teachings well into
account when creating their unique federal structure. The Constitutional Convention of 1787 in
Philadelphia brought together some of the brightest minds this world have ever seen. Their aspirations
were to construct the best possible government, both in theory and reality. Rigorously the concepts of
political thought throughout all time were debated and practical application was eventually settled. In
the end, well constituted branches of governance were supplemented by thoroughly cultivating the goals
of society. The notes from the Constitutional Convention and Federalist papers explain the controls and
purposes of U.S. design of divided of governance. Despite all the attempts to foresee the scenarios a
state may face, there would still be the everlasting issue of interpretation no matter how well the
Constitution was written.69
One can see that the debate between contemporary theorists is very similar to the contentions
raised in the differences of Locke and Rousseau. However, the question remains for the current
literature: who is right? The answer is relatively simply: both are and both are also wrong. As discussed
in the chapters of Locke and Rousseau there are creditable contentions to both arguments of proper
governance. The elements of self-governance, self-determination and self-preservation are salient in the
arguments of Presidentialists and Constitutionalists as well. An associated question is whether or not
acting without the explicit will of the people is a usurpation of power? Presidentialists largely assert no,

67

In The Second Treatise of Governments Locke writes, “Allegiance being nothing but an obedience according to law, which
when he violates, he has no tight to obedience, nor can claim it otherwise than as the public person vested with the power of
the law” (§151, 192).
68 “The surprising scope Locke concedes to the power of the person who is the executive- surprising because his doctrine of
legislative supremacy seems so empathic and unqualified” (Goldwin, 502).
69 Belz writes in his book, “To make the Constitution paramount law in operational fact, however, it was not assert its
supremacy and assume that the people’s innate law-abidingness would give it effect. This was to rely on “paper barriers,”
concerning the efficacy of which there was much skepticism among the Framers. It was necessary also to structure the organs
of government so that power would be internally checked and limited” (25).
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citing that when an executive officer executes abilities beyond or against the wills of the people, they do
so for the good of the people. It is the good of the people that determines ultimately the legitimacy we
provide authority.70 Constitutionalists, oppositely, resoundingly see executive actions without the
explicit will of the people as usurpation of power. Violations of civil laws and constitutions are
trespasses against the highest statements of self-determination of the people. Whether based on
fundamental law or general will, there is still a complicit factor of determination required from the
people of that society in proper governance.
The answer for which categorization is suited for the purpose of achieving the best governance is
both. There are complex and conflicting concepts and goals at hand. The second maxim of executive
prerogative of this thesis contends that it is impossible to eradicate executive prerogative from
governance. Framers of constitutions can only control for it.71 Whether it is general will or fundamental
law, static or dynamic foundations for establishing just governments there exists something outside of a
social contract of a society. This is the logic conclusion so long as theorists agree nations exist before
states. Nations exist with a set of common principles civil laws are built on. Both Locke and Rousseau
contend that powers or rights of individuals do not come from the governments but instead are
inalienable and the rights of self-determination and self-preservation are paramount.
4.3

What is Best for Society?

“America will never be destroyed from the outside. If we falter and lose our freedoms, it will be because
we destroyed ourselves.”
-Abraham Lincoln
It was my aspiration to justly analyze and deduce the principles of proper governance of men
whose capacities far exceed my own. I hoped to shed light on conjectures according to logical
understanding, if I failed to capture the entirety of the argument I ask that the judges of my failures
70

In § 151, Locke talks about officials following “the law,” however to his credit he never fully explained to what law, they
are following, being that the fundamental law of nature reigns supreme.
71 Most of the contemporary theorists reference America’s government. It is worth while noting that there are different ways
in which divided governments can be designed. Many countries around the world are Parliamentary; Rousseau’s suggestion
for Poland was more similar to this as well then our form. By being more accountable to the Legislature in terms of selection
and recalls, to some extent it more thoroughly manages the concerns Constitutionalists have about executive prerogative.
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provide my actual contributions more weight as an offset. The contributions of this thesis one should
now see is that debate of executive prerogative is a debate in proper governance. The aspects of the
original question stated in this thesis have now come more fully into scope, with deriving the three
maxims of executive prerogative.
Focusing on the initial dilemma, what is best for society an executive who is a steward or an
arbiter of the civil laws, is more properly answered full heartily taking into account the essences of
arguments of Locke and Rousseau. Framing the question in this way has enabled the discussion to move
beyond persuasive discourse regarding the constitutionality of executive actions to the very elements at
the heart of governance itself. The degrees of integration of the concepts self-preservation and selfdetermination in a state are indicators of the legitimacy of that government. The relationship between
these concepts is extensively complex and consequently varying the combinations of the elements from
synergistic in nature to antithetical. The third maxim stands as the most problematic to justifying actions
of prerogative. The notable factors that direct outcomes for proper governance are: the spirit of the
people, the relative strength of a cohesive governing entity compared to its nation and the perceived
degree of legitimacy the state retains in its actions.
In the following sections, Rousseau plays a much more dominant role than his counterpart
Locke. This is not in aspiration of denying the brilliance of Locke’s work. Instead, this is simply because
if Locke’s perspective where used when analyzing factors that inhibit potential negative effects of
executive prerogative it would be counter to his logic on the topic. Utilizing Rousseau to describe
executive prerogative at first may have seemed like fallacy in judgment, but this thesis has demonstrated
that his arguments greatly added to the depth of executive prerogative.
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As seen throughout Rousseau’s writings the spirit of the people is vitally important to the health
of a state.72 The citizens’ youthful fiery fervor is self-determination that is loudly heard, and actively
pursued. Despite all the circumstances that could have otherwise decisively ended the Polish Republic
years before Rousseau wrote his recommendations for the nation, the people of Poland staunchly choose
to survive and Rousseau writes why:
Poland, depopulated, devastated, and oppressed, wide-open to its aggressors, in the depths of
misfortune and of anarchy, still shows all the fire of youth. It makes bold, as if it had just sprung
to life to demand government and laws! Poland is in irons but is busy discussing means of
remaining free and feels within itself the kind of strength no tyranny is strong enough to conquer.
I am reminded of the beleaguered Romans, tranquilly disposing of title to the very land upon
which the enemy just pitched camp (The Government of Poland, Ch 1, 2).
The element of self-determination is one that increases the body of the people’s self-awareness of their
civic responsibilities. Rightfully placed, self-determination is altruistic in nature providing individuals
the insight that their own self-preservation is beneficially increased by the community. More importantly
it bonds the ideals of nations and their peoples to the very hearts of individuals. Virtuously communities
are forged that provide assistance to self-determination which is the best prevention to usurpation of
sovereignty. Wrongfully seeded self-determination can modify in form that increases fear and anxiety of
individuals to frantically and unclearly see self-preservation as one that is competition instead of
cooperation. Misdirection of ambitions and desires can easily lead to dissolution of states through mob
rule. Anarchical circumstances provide ripe political vacuums for the rise despots and tyrants. Many
states consider themselves to be representative of the people’s will, in pursuit of that society’s public
good. The ultimate deciding difference between positive and negative outcomes for societies is the
established identity that is molded in a state, in regards to each other and the regime itself.
The relative strength differences between a state and its nation is another significant relationship
that often increases detrimental consequences against liberties. As noted, with the spirit of people, when
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The role of the zeal of youth plays in governance, was previously mentioned in §3.2 of this thesis referencing Rousseau’s
Dedication of The Origin of Inequality (96).
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a nation deteriorates in unity and the true sovereign is usurped the state expands in scope to the point of
eventually reaching despotism or tyranny. Expansion of governments does not require a singular major
redirection change towards dissolution of governance such as mob rule. More often the usurpation of the
people’s will creeps into the regular functions of a state as civic engagement becomes fatigued affording
the eventual exchange in reigns of sovereignty.73 This is what Rousseau warns happens when a peoples
choose to provide tacit compliance as government expand in the vacuum of asserted wills.
The most prolific and timeless avenue that is taken in the displacement of sovereignties is under
the guise of national security. In times of perceived vulnerability, to which a nation’s preservation and
sometimes very existence comes into question people acquiesce notable amounts of their own
determination to the state for security sake. The expansion executive prerogative occurs as the
legislature parlays some of their vested responsibilities to the executive branch in the name of
overseeing security measures of the state. It is national security and foreign policy where executive
discretion will always be the strongest in form and argument of necessity.
The only way to combat the force of the state exerted without will, is to increase the amount of
self-determination that inhibits such expansions in the first place. A spirit of the people is said to be one
that is a spirit of liberty that cannot by recovered but only gained. Gains can be made through
empowering the people and legislature with the abilities and desires of self-governance. The people
should be actively engaged in the social contract paying mind to infractions that may set precedence for
more heinous acts on the part of their government in the future. Improving the spirit of a nation requires
an atmosphere of connection among the citizens of a community. To the Ancients and Rousseau, the
major avenue to incorporating a lasting sense of allegiance and commitment to the goals and objectives
of the greater society is the cultivation of virtue. In modern day nation states virtue is relatively an
antiquated commodity where cultures of individualism thrives in many states, especially our own.
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Rousseau expands upon the death of body politic in The Social Contract, Bk. III Ch. XI (61).
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Throughout history often times the polarization of contrasting classes of people are where the greatest
domestic animosities reside. The spirit of the people in contemporary states rests in the maturation and
up keep of the middle class. A large middle class will ensure a healthy nation that is able to escape the
perils of greed and envy that trap their peers.74 Furthermore, this will likewise have bearing on foreign
policy matters as well, since the state will come to embody this in its larger form, so that its international
relations with other states reflect this quality as well.
Another equally important component to checking wrongfully used executive discretion is
strengthening the legislature, the branch of government that is supposed to represent the will of the
people. The legislature is the designated and legitimate party entrusted by the people to assess and
promulgate the laws of the society. In the United States Government the recommendation of term limits
for Congressional members has been cited as a potential remedy that could change the precedence where
self-interest oriented towards reelection could be replaced with the truly more benevolent motive of
societal interests. Somehow alterations of the perspective of accountability among Congressional
members should inhibit tacitly allowing the usurpation of decision making to the executive. Legislators
often take a cautious approach to law making as a political practice where benefits can be more readily
claimed and adverse political repercussions may be avoided. The extent of legislature revisions are the
usual ones that are often debated such as modifying winner take all systems. Proportional systems are
more representative of the votes cast in elections. This is also arguably a better reflection of the actual
will of the people. The consequences of this will also dramatically alter the landscape of political parties
that are now greatly supported by winner take all systems. Proportional allotment is used by many states
structured that have parliaments. In short, will being the entity that legitimizes authority, it is also the
source required to control the misuse of discretionary force.

74

In The Political Economy, Rousseau writes about the virtues of the middle class (Bk. II., 145).
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The faith the people have in the state to act in accordance with their will is extremely important.
If the state makes blatant trespasses against the sovereign usurpation of people’s self-determination will
be justly realized placing the regime in a state of war with the nation. The state of war between tyrants
and their people can be affected by the perception of whether or not this has actually occurred. Locke
asserts that people taken advantage of will readily act to restore their natural inalienable rights.
The question is not whether or not executive prerogative was a usurpation of power. Even
Rousseau’s discourses admit the lives of the states require an inalienable function that can react to
situations with indivisible force and will. The very stability governance rests on the public perception
that laws are mutually obligatory. As this is an essential element to self-determination. Good executives
realize that righteous executive discretion is a duty not a right of the office and do their best to hold
intact the concept of well-structured social contracts. Executives should avoid as much as possible
performing acts of deception that would undoubtedly undermine the trust and order of a said
government. The people must believe in the social contract. Failure or deterioration of the faith of the
people results in separate interests and sovereignties. The results are loss of authority of the civil laws
and consequently the legitimacy of a state.
The question all peoples of any nation and governance must ask themselves is “Do we believe
that the means taken to achieve our respective ends impacts our objective goals?” To those that reply no,
and will be most appropriately be disposed to the evasive and unquestioned use of executive prerogative.
These individuals, however, will be merely individuals in reference to each other lacking intertwined
objectives. These people will only have similar interests that may held be common. The nations founded
on such principles will always falter then in their hearts, as their allegiance is independent that of the
state.75
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Niccolo Machiavelli, highlights in The Prince, similar to the notion advocated by Rousseau, the difference between
creating modes and orders among men. There is a difference between crafting states and regimes in structure and making
lasting ideologies that live forever in the hearts of men, despite their relative situation of governance.
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Governance is the embodiment of both will and force. If explicit will of the people lacks a voice or
direction and the opportunity for individual or corporate will to displace the general will is present then
it usurp the sovereignty of the community. In the best case scenario it will be for the good of the people.
More frequently, individual or corporate interests are employed at the sufferance of the people. Do we
pretend to live in a world where the principles of fundamental law sufficiently provide us all an ability to
rightfully discern all the actions of contemporary governments? What is our priority in directing our
objectives of governance: Self-preservation or self-determination? While revisions to existing states is
undeniably difficult. The concepts and relationship of the elements of proper governance discussed here
be most helpful to the many constitutions that are currently and in the future being founded. The three
maxims proposed in this thesis stand as defining elements of executive prerogative.
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